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THE COURTS, Fl:DERALISM, AND THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, I 920-2000
I:DW1\l{D A. PLll{Cl!LL,

JI,.

The history of American federalism in the twentieth century falls into thrt'c
distinct periods. The era of.post-Reconstructioll federalism, which hegall in
the late nilleteenth celltury, ended in the years after 1 929 when a sltattcri11g
series of domestic a11d international crises combined with rhe innovative
presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt to reoriem the nation's laws, politics,
and institutions. The resulting "New Deal Order .. lasted for allllost fivL·
decades before crumbling in the ce!ltury's last quarter when massive social,
cultural, economic, and political changes cornhined with rite dralllatizing
presidency of Rollaid Rea,,an to begin reorientin« rhe system once a«ain.
Ar century's end, rhe nat::,re and ~·ourse of that,-,emcrging era rem,~m-d
unsettled.

I. TIIE NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF AMFRIC:AN FEDFRALISI\I
With a de facto default rule favoring decentralization, American federalism
is a governmental systelll based 011 the cx1stenn' of independenr political
Power at both stare ,111d national levels. Its essence lies, first, 111 rhe institutional tensions that the Constitution structured between the two levels
of"
l Ill
· t I1e comp Iex processes o 1· LIeus1on
. .
.
,-,overnrnent, anL I seconL,
ma I,lllg
th at the Constitution established to maintain satisfactory relario11s lx-rweell
th e two levels. Those processes were cornplex because they involved, on the
national side, three distinct and counrcrpoised hra11Clws of govcrnmem
and, on rhe state side, a growing multitude of equal, independem, and
often conflicting governing units. In theory, ,md somcrimes ill practice,
national power served to foster economic integration and efficiency, faC1l1tare the development and enforcement of desirable un1forlll standards,
enable the people to deal effectively with problems national and international in scope, protect the security and general welfare of the nation as
a Whole, and safeguard liberty by check111.l.!; the potential tyranny of local
ftJajorities. Conversely, also in theory and sometimes in practice, state power
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served to foster economic innovation and dficiency, nourish social and cultural diversity, encourage democratic participation, facilitate the adoption
of narrow solutions tailored to special local problems, and safeguard liberty
by checking the potential tyranny of national majorities.
As a matter of historical developmem, American federalism gave rise to
a dynamic and fluid political system in which competing groups and coalitions struggled for control of the nation's diverse centers of governmental
power and used constitutional arguments to place decision-making authority over contested issues in the level and branch of government that seemed,
at any given time, most likely to support their values, interests, and aspirations. The claim of ''state sovereignty," for example, which I imi red or denied
the authority of the national government, served a variety of diverse groups
over the centuries: Jeffersonian Democrats in the r 790s, New England
Federalists during the War of r 8 r 2, South Carolina nu! lifiers in the r 8 _',OS,
Northern ami-slavery civil libertarians before the Civil War, and then from
Reconstruction to the late twentieth century those who clefrnded racial
segregation and disenfranchisement. The pressures generated by successive waves of such diverse groups and coalitions - themselves the products
of relentless social and economic change - drove the system's evolution.
Certain widely sharl'd cultural cornmitml'nts - to republican government,
the common law, religious freedom, private property, and individual liberty - combined with the idea of a written Constitution and the reality
of institutionally divided powers to constrain and channel that evolution.
But the system's operations and assumptions continued to shift as changing cultural values, social conditions, economic innovations, institutional
practices, legal theories, judicial decisions, and constitutional amu1dments
blurred or redrew the lines of state and federal authority.
In that long and complex historical process, one issue repeatedly t'ml.'fged
as pivotal: what institutions or procedures existed to settll' disputes ovl'r the
respective spheres of state and federal authority; Americans debated t!wr
issue vigorously for eight decades and then, in the Civil War and its three
co11stiturional amemlmcnts, settled it in part. Thl' national govcrnmuit,
not thl' states, held dispositivc authority. Neither thl' war nor its resulting constitutional amendments, however, answered two further questions:
which branch or branches of the federal governml'nt held that authority)
And how was the authority to be exercisecP Much of the history of American
li:dcralisrn after the Civil War revolved around the contested answers given
to those two questions, as the three f<.-deral branches - each responding to
the values and intnests that dominatcxl it at any given timl' - adopted
diverse and somcrirncs rn111lini11g policies that kd them to defer to state
prerogatives on some occasions and trump them on others.
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Indeed, as American life became increasingly centralized and homogenized in the late nineteenth and twenricth centuries, many of the distinctive and authentically "local" values and inrerests thar had originally
givL·n the fr·deral system its embedded social meaning withered or became
suspect. Some blended into emerging and widely shared national values
and imerests; others grew attenuated or disappeared entirely; a fi_·w - most
obviously, rhose involving racial oppression -- were explicitly repudiated
by new national majorities and constitutional arnemlmcnts. The result was
that the ingrained cultural understandings of the late eighteemh and early
nit1tteenrh centuries gradually disintegrated, the lived social meaning of
Amnican fcxleral ism grew more amorphous and contestable, and the distincrivcly local values and interests that the system protected increasingly
appeared either narrow and parochial or vague and abstract. Over the course
of the twentieth cemury the idea of American federal ism as a normative concept - that the C:onstiturion set out clear Iincs thar ddined and d isringu 1shed
st atc and federal powers - grew ever more amorphous and manipulable.
Thus, the history of American k·deralism cannot be understood by focusing solely 011 constitutional provisions or theories of frdcral1srn. The Con'ititution provided a sound framework of governmcllt and a shrewd system
ot insr1tutionalized checks and balances, but it did nor draw bright or generally dcrerminative lines of aurhority between state and fi:deral power nor
specify any particular "balance" between them. Similarly, theories of fr·dnalisn1 provided a range of normative base! 1nes, but their spn i fie In junctions
WL-re invariably construed diversely and contested sharply. Indenl, conllict1ng views of federalism existed from the nation's bc;..'.inning, and the passing
Years producL"d a smorgasbord of new variations, each inspired by and suf-fusL·d with the emerging values, interests, expccrations, and preconceptions
of its advocates. The federal structure helped sustain rhe nation's cornmitrnult to Ii mired government, cultural diversity, and individual liberty, but
Its history can be understood fully only by examining how and why its
Practical operations evolved, its political si,~nificance shifted, its social const''-ILicnces unfolded, and its ideological contours pniodically eroded and
reformed.
Since rhc early decades of the nineteenth cemury, the prevailing theheld that the C:rn1stirution esrablishnl a system of "dual federalism."
I he pnnup
. · 1cs arrri·t)Utcc I to t I1e system were i-cw. 'fl 1c nat1011a
I governnient was one of limited and delegated powers only; the states were indePtndent sovereigns with exclusive authority over local matters reserved to
th
en1 by the Tenth Amendmcnt; and the powers of the two governments
Wer,,' 1·1 1111tec
. I to " separate sp I1eres " ancI rntcnc
.
l ec I to serve as c I1cc k·s on one
another.

'.)?

l.C\O

Et!1l'urd i\. Pm·ccll. Jr.

Although the actual practice of American frderalism was always more
complicated than the thl:'ory of dual fr·dl:'ralisrn implil:'d, during the late
ninctl'l'nth and C:',trly twentieth century fivl' acccll:'rating tkvelopmellts substa11tially rl:'shaped the systl:'m. First, spl:'ctacular revolutions 111 transportation and communications together with t!w ongoing processes of industrialization, urbanization, westward expansion, and economic CC:'ntralization
remade American society. What in 1 789 had bl:'en a collection of geographically rooted, lornlly oriented, and culturally diversl:' island communities
had by 1920 become an increasingly mobile, nationally oriented, and economically and culturally integrated nation. Ever widening areas oflifr Wl'IT
corning to have national significance, and Americans from coast ro coast
increasingly fi1ced similar problems that flooded beyond the ability of individual stares to remedy.
Second, the powerful ninl'teenth-cl:'ntury bl:'lief that the primary function of governml:'nt was to protect privatl:' property and economic ft-cl:'dorn
was weakenmg. Since the Civil War govl:'rnments at all levels had become
incrl:'asingly active in attempting to deal with the massive social disruptions
that came with urbanization and industrialization. Repeatedly the states
increased taxes and expandl:'d their activities, ll'gislating over a widening
variety of social and economic problems and establishing administrative
agencies to regulate railroads, insurance companies, and many other types
of business. They raised their funding for local governments, for example,
from barely $50 million in 1902 to almost $Goo million by 1927.
Third, the fcckral govu·nment was growing at an even more accelerated
rate. Although the states still employed several times as many workl'rs and
spent more than twicl' as much money as the federal government, thl' balance
of power between the two was shifting. As C:'Conomic and cultural centralization proceeded, the political consl:'nsus that had tilted strongly toward
decentralization in thl:' early ninC:'teL·nth Lentury was moving by century's
end toward support of more and broader governml:'nt action at the national
IC:'vcl. In 1 887 the fi::deral government began to USC:' its authority over interstate commerce to regulate the new national economy, and by the secoml
decade of thL· twentieth century it had asserted extu1sive national control
over interstate transportation and communications while subjecting orhn
interstate husinl:'sses to an expanding variety of l1C:'W federal regulations.
Fourth, running against that nationalizing current, a vehl'mcnt ITaction
against Reconstruction among white Americans had severely constrained
thl' power of the federal govl:'rnment to protl:'ct the rights of African Americans. Notwithstanding thl' Civil War amendments, an informal national
SC:'ttkmcnt in the century's last decades had succl:'ssfully rl:'defined most matters involving black civil and political rights as local issul:'s that propl'rly
fell within the exclusive authority of thl' states. Increasingly, the cries of
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"states' rights," "state sovereignty," and the "principles of federalism" were
identified with the esrabl ishment and preservation of racial segregation and
disenfranchisement.
Finally, the power of the federal judiciary was growing relative to that of'
both Congress and the stares, and by the early twentieth cemury the l 1.S.
Supreme Court had emerged as the ultimate - if still sharply contestl'll authority or1 the law of both American f,,..deralism and the new national
economy. The nation's commitmem to law and rhe ideal of'limitnl constitutional government had led Alllericans gradually to embrace rhe Court -"the Court" as they callle ro call it - and Hs umpiring role, while rhe srructure of the federal judiciary - like that of rhe exernrive branch bur unlike
that of Congress -allowed the Court to act relatively quickly anc.l c.leusivdy.
The Court deterlllined the exrenr to which any governlllenr could regulate
business and property as well as the particular level of govern1rn:nt that
could regulate them. On rhe former issue, it held that a narrow range of
econornic activities "affrcted with a public interest" WL'IT subwct w L'xtensive regulation, bur chat most business and property rclllaincd "private"
and subject only to minimal regulation. On the latter issue, it held that
specific economic activities found to be "closely" or "directly" relarl'll to
interstate collllllerce were national i11 scope and hl'l1ce subject to fi:c.leral
control under the C:ornme1-ce Clause hut that rhe bulk of such activities
remained local and subject to regulation only by the statL·s. As a gcnl'ral
111 atter, the Court's rulings gradually extended rhe powers of the fi:c.leral
governmenr while restricting rhe power of the states to i11trudc imo the
Workings of the burgeonrng national lllarket. To enforce its malllLrte, the
Courr l"l·shaped the jurisdiction of rhc lower federal courts ro make them
ll1ore effective instruments of national judicial authority, turning rl1L·m from
disputes between private parties over issues of local law ro suits that challenged government action or raised issues ofnarional law. l11crcasi11gly, too,
th e Court exercised its burgeoning power. I 11 Sl'VL'nty-one years up rn 18(,o
It had held only 2 federal and (10 state statutes u11consr1rutio11al, bur 111 a
mere thirty-nine years from 1898 to 19 )7 it vrndcd ')CJ federal and 1r1ri
st are laws.
·

II. NATIONAI.I/.ATION AND TIIF DH LINI; OF
POST-REC:ONSTRlJC:TION HDl;RALISM: FROM
\XIOIUD \XIAR TO Tl!E CR FAT Dl;PRl'SSION

\X!hen 1920 dawned, American federalism seemed on rhe verge ofeve11 more
snb st anrial change. Pre-war Progressivism had focused American policies
011
the national level, and constit~1tional alllendrnents authorizing a federal
inconw tax and the popular election ofsenarors had expanded fednal pown
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enormously while curtailing thl: power of state legislatures. Both amendments gave thc American people a new and dirl:ct involvement in their
national government, while the income tax provision allowcd the fedenil
government to raise virtually uni imited amounts of money, paving the way
for explosive growth in the future. The Supreme Court, too, had seemed
willing to approve some widcning assertions of national power by stretching the limiting categories of business "affected with a public interest" and
activities "closely" related to interstate commcrce.
Most dramatic were the changes that followed American entry into World
War I. Relying principally on their war powers, Congress and Democratic
President Woodrow Wilson exercised unparalleled authority. They estab1ished national conscription, took control of the nation's transportation and
communications systems, imposed tight rcstrictions on the distribution of
food and fi.1d, asserted authority over relations betwcen labor and management, and expanded the fr:deral income tax system drastically. In addition,
through the Espionage and Scdition Acts they prohibitcxl a variety of activities ~ including speech critical of the government~ that might interfere::
with the war effort. They criminalizcd, for example, "disloyal, profane,
scurrilous, or abusive language" directed at thl' Constitution, thl' armcd
forces, the government, or the flag. 1 Pcrhaps most arresting, by statute and
then by constitutional amcndment Congress and the statcs prohibited the
manufacture, salc, and transportation of alcoholic beverages in the United
States. Ratified in 1 ') 19, thl' Eightcenth Amendment conferred on the federal government authority to enforce nationwide Prohibition and expanded
its powcr into areas that had pt"l'viously been considered both local and
private::.
The war challenp;ed the structure of post-Reconstruction federalism in
other ways as well. Politically, it led to the adoption of yet another nationalizing constitutional amendment, the Nineteenth, which prohibited the
states from denying the vote to women and conferrcd on Congrl'ss thl' power
to enforcc its mandate. Institutionally, the war induccd thc Supreme Court
to back away from its umpiring role and watch passively as Congress and
the president exercised sweeping war powers. Socially, thl' war's proclaimed
goal of making "the world safc for dcmocracy" even hinted at the possibility
of change in the nation's racial status quo.
Although post-Reconstruction federalism trembled, it did not crumble::.
The end of the war brought a suies of bitter labor strikcs, a brief but virulent
Rc-d Scare, rcpl'ated outbrcaks of anti-black violence, rapidly rising prices
followed by a short dcprl'ssion, and spreading resentment at the administration's continucd usl' and abusl' of its war powers. Those events destroyed
1
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Wartime unity, fragmc:ntcd Progressivism, and generated a powerful desire
for a return to a more stable and tranquil order. 111 1920 the reaction ,1.;ave
the Republicans control of both Congress and the prc·s1dency. With rhc help
of returning prospnity, the Republicans mainrained thar hold for a decade,
t"nsuring a government of" order, conservatism, business dorni11ario11, and
minimal economic reguL1tion. Under their rule, Republicans annoumTd,
America was entering a "New Era" of sustained LTonornic prog1Tss and
prosperity. For almost a decade their promise seemed golden.
The national turnaround in 1 920 induced the Court ro JTassert its authority. In cautious dicta it began to suggest jll(liually enforceable limits on
federal war powers, and in 192 r it invalidated un vagueness grounds the
st ature that had authorized federal conrrol over food during and after the war.
Then, within two years, Warren I larding, rhc new Republican president,
appoinred four new justices - including ex-President William I loward 'Eifr
as ChiefJ ustice - who were more conservative and property conscious tha11
their predecessors. The stage was set for a period of conservative judicial
activism.
The new 'J (di: Court moved quick! y to ensure social stabi 11 ty, 1mpose j ud icial limitations on both state and fc:deral governnwms, and protect bus1llc·ss, propnty, and the expandmg national market. 111 less rhan a decade
1t invalidated legislation - in most cases measures passed liy the stares -in approximately 140 decisions, a rate far higher than that of any previOl!s Court. Its efforts were unwirringly enhanced by a seemingly tnlm1cal
Jllrisdictional statute enacted in 192 ':i- The so-called Ju,li.;es· Bi 11 made the
Colin's appd late jurisdiction almost wholly d iscretio;1ary·, thereby enabl 1ng
It to decide freely not just how, but when and where, it would assnt its
,lllthority. After 1925 the Court's role in American governmem continued
to expand, and its efforts became more purposeful, as shifting coalitions of
Jll st ices lc·arned to use the Court's new jurisd1nional discretion to set their
<iwn agendas.
Three of" the 'Edi: Court's early decisions 1-cvc·alnl its dncrminarion ro
trnposc limits on government. Pe11111rfr,111ic1 Co,1! Co, 1·. 1\L1holl ( I <)22) lirnlttd horh state and f<.·deral pown over private property liy holdmg th,l!
reglllatory actions that wem "too far" consrirutnl "takings" that, absent
compensation, wne invalid under the Fifth am! Fourteenth Amend1nenrs.·'
Sirnilarly, 1\ilki11.1 /'. Chilclrm'1 [lo.1f!i!t1! ( 1925) invalidated a minimum wage
law , -d type o f- statute t I1t' c-,ourt ,s conservative
· JUst1ces
- cons 1,- lere, I espeua- II y
obnoxious. Aclk111r proclaimed freedom of contract "the ,1.;eneral rule" and
government regulation an "exception" confined to a frw narrow categories
of specially "public" matters."' As much as the two cases demonstrated the
" 2 liu
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Court's determination to limit government regulation, however, they also
suggested the difficulty the justices faced in their task. In each, the Court
acknowledged that the limiting categories it used were incapable of precise
delineation, a confession that highlighted the extent to which the lines it
drew were the product, not simply of the Constitution, bur of the dominant
attitudes of the era ,md the specific values of the justices themselves.
The third decision, /3c1iley 1•. Dre:,:el /!1m1it11re Co. ( 1922), was directed
solely at the federal government and sought to infuse new Iife into the
idea of dual federalism. Only four years earlier the Court had struck down
the first federal Child Labor Law, ruling in lfcm1111er 11• Dc1,~mhc1rl (1918)
that the commerce power did not allow Congress to ban the products of
child labor from interstate commerce. Though seemingly inconsistent with
prior dc_:cisions, Hcm1//ler voided the child labor statute on the ground that it
was not a true effort to regulate interstate commerce, but rather a disguised
attempt to intrude_: into a "local" activity- the production of goods- that the
Tenth Amendment reserved to the states. Amid a popular outcry against
the decision, Congress respondnl with the Child Labor 'fax Act, relying
on the i"cckral taxing power to impose special charges on employers who
used child labor. Drexel /!11mit11re declared the_: second federal child labor
act another subterfuge, one intended not to raise revc_:nue but to regulate ,1
local matter. Following f lc1111111er, it held the act invalid as a violation of the
'!<:nth Amendment. It was "the hip;h duty of this court" to protect "local
self-government" from "national power" and to preserve the federal system
that, the justices declared, was "the ark of our covenant." If it failed to block
the Child Labor 'fax Law, Drexel F11rnil11re warned, Congress could use its
taxing power "to rake_: over to its control any one of rhe great number of
subjects of public interest" that the Constitution reserved to the states. 1
Like earlier Courts, however, the 'fafr Court shaded its fe:-deral1sm decisions to fir its social values. It ignored I-ic1111111er when Congress passed ,1
statute prohibiting the movement of stolen vehicles in interstate commerce,
avoided Drexel /!11rni//1re when Congrc_:ss used its taxing power to control narcotics, and construed the commerce power with exceptional breadth when
business invoked the federal antitrust laws ro break a small union's boycott
of local employers. The Court stretched national power in the first case to
protect private propc_:rry, in the second to allow government ro control what
rhe justices viewed as a moral and social evil, and in the third ro check a
potentially powerful weapon of organized labor.
The_: particular social values that the 'fafr Court protc_:cted quickly generated political controversy. Provoking strong opposition from Progressives
and organized labor, its decisions sparked a variety of proposals for "curbing"
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tht Court by restricting its juri~diction or requiring a supermajority vote of
six or seven justices to i11validate legislation. I 11 r 924 Republican Senator
Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin helped organize a new Progressive Party
and ran for president on a platform that indicted tht Court as an antiprogrcssivc· and pro-busi ncss partisan. I fr· proposed a constitutional amendn1enr that would authorize Congress to override a11y decision invalidating
one of its statutes. Rising to the Court's defense, most Republicans and
Democrats castigated the proposal as a radical and destructive assault on
the foundations of A1llcrica11 federal ism. I11 the clcctio11 La Follette did wcl I
for a third-party rn11diclatc, hut he was overwhclmnl in a Republican landsliclc. While the election revealed widespread hostility to the 'Lift Court, it
also suggested that the great majority of Americans supported the Court's
institutional role, even if many of them disliked some of its 111dividual
decisions.
Rtspo11ding to LaFollette and othn critics, Charles Warren, the nation's
preeminent historian of the Supreme Court, seemed to speak for most Americans -- even many Progressives - when he praised the Court for playing
an essential institutional role in the f<.·dcral system. The "cxistl·nce of the
American form of government - a federal republic with limited national
powers - imp! ics and requires for its presc-rvation the existence ofa Suprtme
Court," he declared. "The rctcntio11 of such a republic is inseparably hound
up with the retention ofa Court having authority to enforce the limitation
of national powers." Warren articulated a liclicf that had licen spreading
since the mid-nineteenth cemury and that had become sacred writ arnong
conservatives by the early twcnr1nh: the Supreme Court was the anchor oi"
American huovcrnmc11t , the 11aramount bulwark 11rou·crinu
h the American
People and their liberties from the dangers posed by an othnwise u11controliahlc and centralizing national govcrnrncnt. "It is, of course, possible to
have a republic without a Supreme Court," Warren explained; "hut it will
lx• a republic with a consolidated and autocratic government, a government
111 which the States and the citizens will possess 110 right or power save such
as Congress, in its absolute discretion, secs fit rn leave to them.'",
Although T1fr and a majority of his Court shared both Warren's suspicions of Congress and hi~ conclusions about the Court's essential role, they
ill·vc-rtheless sought to accornmodate what they considered the reasonable
dernands for more active government that flown! from the continuing centralization ofAmeric111 social and economic lit<.·. Cautiously, they cominued
th e· process of expanding fr·dcral power undn the Commerce Clause and,
111 a more i11novativc move, approved a broadened use of kderal taxing
and spending powers. In 1\lt1_1_1ad1111el/1 1: /\lel/011 ( H)2 _-\) the Court upheld
'Ciiarlcs \X/arrrn, Co11,~rc11.
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a statute that provided fedc.:ral funds for state infant and maternity care
programs. Th<:' decision in effect sanctioned the federal government's power
to offer monetary grants to states conditioned on their acceptance of kderal use restrictions, and it th<:'reby allowl'd Congress to legislate ~ albeit
indirectly~ over matters that seemed entirely "local." In the 1 <)2os such
federal grants were few in numb<:r and small in scale, but during the 11ext
half-c<:ntury th<:y would <:xpand dramatically.
The 'faft Court also l'Xtl'ndnl fed<:ral judicial pow<:r over the srat<:s by
expanding the meaning of"lib<:rty" in th<: Fourteenth Am<:11dment. On one
front it voicll'd stat<: statutes that rcstricred the educational opportunitil's
of children. The Court held that the amendment protected certain perso11al
and familial rights, including the right of parems to rrnr and educatl' their
childr<:n as they wished. On a second front the Court began to co11sicll'r
the claim that rl1<: First Amendment right of frt:e speech also constrained
th<: states. Succ<:ssful prosecutions under the Sedition and Espiona,~l' Acts
had provoked pownful dissents from Justices Oliver Wendell llolmes,
Jr. and Louis D. Brandeis; and, after th<: postwar hysteria had dissipated,
many Arn<:ricans came to bcli<:ve that governmental power to punish speech
should be limited more tightly. In Git/011' 1'. Neu· York ( 1925) the Court
a1111ounc-cd that the right offre<: speech recognized by the First Amendment
was part of the "liberty" prot<:cted by the Fourrc-cnth Amendnwnt and,
consequently, was bi11ding on the states as well as the federal govcrnmenr.
Although the Court's decisions in these areas were fr,w, they created a rich
seedbed for the future.
C:onversdy, considering the rights of African Americans, the Taft Court
left post-Reconstruction federalism <:ssentially unchanged. Refusing to
question racial se,~re,~ation and disenfranchisement, it protected African
American rights only in the most outrageous and exceptional cases. In 01w,
where it granted habeas corpus rclid- to an African American sentenced
to death in a Southern state court, it could not ignore the fact that the
cll'fcndant had been convicted on unsubstamiated charges by an all-white
Jury that had b<:en surroumll'd and intimidated by an angry white mob. In
another, where it invalidated an "all-white" Texas primary clect1on system,
it could not deny th<: explicitly racial nature of the legal discrimination or
i rs negation of the fundamental constitutional right of all citizens to vote.
In each case, however, the Court stressed the narrowness of its decision.
Federal habeas corpus was rarely available, it declared, and criminal matters Wl'IT ordinarily local issues for the stares alon<: to resolve. Similarly,
the all-white primary was unconstitutional solely because its racially discriminatory natutT was explicitly written into state law. Indeed, a decade
later the Court unanimously approved a slightly more indirect version of
the all-white state primary, one that was equally dfrcrive in maintaining
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black disenfranchisement but more cleverly designed as a matter of reig11ing
constitutional law.
For their part, the states in the 1920s continued ro set policy not only in
matters concerning race but also in most other areas that aflc·cted daily l1k,
and they continued as well to provide most of the government services that
Americans received. During the r 920s the states accounted for al most threequarrers of all public spending and two-thirds of the taxes col lcnnl. While
a ftw sought to sustain the tradition of pre-war reform, most conformed to
the conservative national mood that underwrote the Republicans· New Era.
Largdy abandon mg efforts to regulate business and enact progressive social
legislation, they sought to trim government regulation and concTntrated
much of their spendmg on highway construction to meet the exploding
demands created by the automobile. lndicative of the political mood, the
States raised most of their highway money through regressive gasol 1ne taxes,
which by r929 accounted for 25 percent of their total rax receipts. Indeed,
while thirteen states had enacted mildly progressive income tax laws in the
decade after 191 r, during the New Era only one state, New l lampshire,
adopted such a tax. As a general matter, the govc-rnments of both states and
nation seemed in accord on the basic issues of social and econ om 1c pol icy.
Both seemed content, for the most part, to keep a low profile and give
business its head.
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The year 1929 witnessed the onset of the decade-long and world-wide ( ;rear
Depression. Causing massive disruptions and hardships, the Depression
challenged the capacities of democratic governments throughout the world.
The resulting turmoil paved the way for Adolph I litlcr to seize power in
Gern1any, energized the forces of international Communism, aml u Itimately
helpc·d bring on a second ;ind far more destructive world war. In the lJnitcd
Srates it ga~e birth to the New Deal and, togcthc-r with the- war and Cold
War that followed, transformed Amc-rican kdcralism.

'the Ciru1/ De/1re1_1i1111 ,111d the 1:rl//111l1t111111 o/tbc /\!w' Dcdl 01dcr
The ravages of unemployment, bankruptcies, foreclosures, hank failut-cs,
10st savings, and crushed hopes savaged all classes and regions. Those 1dem1hed with the roseate New Era of the r 920s - primarily business, the Republican Parry, and the federal judiciary - quickly became objects of angc-r and
di st rust. Governments at all levels tried to respond to the emergency. State
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and local agencies, however, could provide neither the relief nor the structural reforms that seemed necessary. By 19 :-1 T their resources were exhausted,
and the national and international scope of the ever-deepening crisis was
undeniable. The frderal government under Republican President Herbert
1-foover became increasingly active, but it furnished far too little in the
way of either money or leadership. The experience taught Americans two
fundam(:'ntal kssons: that a massive governmental respons(:' was necessary
and that only national action could possibly be adequate.
From 1'.>°iO to T93(i four successive elections repudiated the Republicans, and after 1932 the Democrats firmly controlled both the legislative
and executive branches of the frderal government. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's Nt:w Deal initiated a wide range of efforts to provide emergency
relief, restructure and stimulate the economy, and reform the nation's financial institutions. Although the administration worked closely with state
and local governments, political power shifted decisively to the federal
level. The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the Agricultural
Adjustment Act (AAA), for example, the New Deal's major initial efforts to
reorganize and revive the economy, imposed sweeping fed(:'ral controls and
reached extensively into matters of industrial and agricultural production
that hitherto had seemed both local and private.
While the conservative orientation of the frderal judiciary clouded
the future, it S(:'emed possible that the New Deal might proceed without e1Kountering fatal constitutional obstacles. The Taft Court had been
split between six conservatives and three progressives, but that lineup had
changed in 191,0 when "fafr and one of his conservative colleagues died.
Charles Evans Hughes, a relatively progressive Republican, became Chief
Justice, and the moderate Republican, Owen J Roberts, filled the second
opening. In the early 19_:;,os the two new justices voted with the three
progressiv(:'s in a number of critical cases, and they seemed to have tipped
the judicial balance. The Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment to safoguard freedom of speech and provide some protection for African Americans
in Southern state courts, and it gave broad constructions to both the commerce power and the category of business "affrcted with a public interest."
Further, in two sharply divided 5-4 decisions - with both Hughes and
Roberts joining the Court's three progressives - it recognized the need for
both state and federal governments to have emergency powers to combat
the depression.
If the Hughes Court was different from the "faft Court, however, it
nonetheless remained committed to enforcing limits on economic regulation by both the states and the federal government. In early I ()~-\5 it invalidated a part of the NIH.A and then began a series of rulings - with Roberts
and sometimes I Iughes joining the four conservatives - that checked state
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and federal re:gulatory power and, in the process, declared both the AAA and
the remainder of the NIRA u11co11stitutionaL Invoking the Tenth Amendment to invalidate another New Deal measure, Roberts and the four conservatives emphasized that "every addition to the national legislative power
to some extent detracts frorn or invades the power of the states ... c,
While the anti-New Deal majority invoked the idea of fr·deralism, the
dis,emers often did the same. Illustrating the intrinsically doublc-edi,ed
nature of the concept, Justice Brandeis, the C:outt's leading progressive,
deployed 1t to urn.lcrmrne the conservative majority. Excessive centralization could flow not only from Congress, he warned in 1 ')-\2, but from the
fedc:ral judiciary as well. In voiding the reasonable social and econrnnic
regulations that the states attempted, Brandeis declared, the Court was
llot exercising "the function of judicial review, but the function of a supcrlegislature." Jts anti-progressive decisions unwisely restricted the states and
improperly centralized American government. Moreover, he charged, the
Court's decisions negated a signal virtue of American frderalism. "It is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory," Brandeis explained, "and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 1-csr of the
country." Confronted by "an emergency more serious than war," Americans had the right to experimem with a variety of possible remedies, and
the· nat1on's fr·dl'.ral system was de·signnl to allow such diverse and crl'ative
dforrs. 7 Turning the rabies on the conservative majority, Brandeis used
his progressive theory of' "experimentalist" federalism ro indict the Court
itself as a centralizing force that was obstructing the· fedu·,d system's proper
operation.
Not surprisingly, the double-edged nature of American fedl'ralism provided the· Court's anti-progressive majority with a ready response. The
st ates could "indul"e in experimental lei..;islat1011 .. Justin· Gcor"c Sutherland replied for the 7onservat1ve 1rn1Jori ty'. bur thq: c;nild nor "rra:~sccnd the
limitations imposl'.d upon them by the frderal Constitution." National l11nIts existed and controlled, and the Court itself was the institution that identified and applied those limits. ''The pri11ciple is embedded in our constitutional system," he declared, "that there arc certain essentials of liberty with
Which the state is not emitled to dispense in the i merest of expcri rnenrs ....,
Thus, the Supreme Court ~ the ostensible bulwark of fr·deralism ~ once
r,
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again suved not as the defender of state autonomy but as an agent of
national power.
The Court's anti-New Deal decisions set up one of the most famous
episodes in its history, the "Constitutional Revolution of r<:)7,7." The standard tale is familiar and the storyline dramatic. Overwhelmingly reelected
with crushing Democratic majorities in both Houses of Congress, Roosevelt
stunned the: nation with his proposal to "pack" the Supreme Court by adding
one new justice, up to a total of six, for every member of the Court over
the age of seventy. Then, while Congress and the nation debated the plan,
the: Court suddenly seemed to change its position. In a series of 5-4 decisions - I lughes and Roberts joining the three progressives - it discarded
the doctrine of liberty of contract and drastically broadened federal pown.
Over the next few years the Court's four conservatives resigned, and the
president replaced them with loyal New Dealers who extended the changes
the Court had begun in the spring of r97,7.
The traditional story over-inflates the role of the Court-packing plan and
oversimplifies the processes of constitutional change. The label "revolution,"
moreover, obscures complexities. There was continuity as well as change
in the Court's decisions, and many of the innovations that occurred had
roots in earlier periods and witnessed their full flowering only in later
ones. In spite of the qualifications necessary, however, the traditional story
highlights a fundamental fact: the New Deal years brought fundamental
and far-reaching changes to the frderal system.
First, the New Deal altered the way the system functioned. Centralizing many arl'as of American life, a dozl'n path-brl'aking measures assl'rted
nl'w or expancll'd federal authority over the nation's economy and financial
system. The National Labor Relations Act, for l'xample, which the Court
upheld under a broadened commerce power, extended federal regulatory
authority co the employment relationship and guarameed labor the right
to organize and bargain collcccivcly. The result was the centralization of
government labor policy, the prl'emption of many state laws considered
hostile co workl'fs, and che transformation of organized labor inco a nl'wly
pO\vl'rful and nationalizing force in American politics. Similarly, the Social
Security Act, which the Court upheld under a broad construction of the
spending and taxing powers, established t!w institutional foundations for ,1
limited national welfarl' statl'. The act placl:'d special taxes on workt·rs and
l'mployl·rs, crl:'atl'd a variety of federal social support programs, and used
condicional grants to enlist scare participation and impose federal standards
on their operation.
In addition, the New Deal moved the federal governnll'llt into a widl'ning range of previously local areas. It establishl'd agencil's to insure individual home mortgages and private bank accounts, for example, and it
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funded a series of massive projects to construct local public facilities and
provide employmt·nt for millions. Using its power to tax and spend, it provickd grants to states for a variety of new programs and raised the amounts
involved into the billions of dollars. The grants extended federal involvemc·nt into such previously local areas as employment counseling, health
care, public housing, conservation, slum clearance, social welfare, and child
care programs.
Numbers told much of the story. In 191 :\ state and local governments
had spent more than twice as much as rhe federal government, bur by 1942
their spend mg amounted ro barely a quarter of the national total. Federal
expenditures skyrocketed from less than ',CJ percent to almost 80 percent of
total government spending in the Un ired States. Similarly, in , 929 frderal
grants to stare and local agencies had stood at less than $1ou million, but
after 19 "\'5 they avera,ged more than a billion dollars a year.
Furrhc·r, rhe New Deal altered the functioning relationship between kdlTa] and state governments. As growing fcxleral financing made national
direction seem, increasingly appr:)priarc.', the fc·deral gove1'.nrnent began to
expand its administrative capacities and enforce righter and more derailed
controls over its grants. Some of the condnirn1s it imposed began to regulate not just spc'.nding hut also the operations of the state ,rnci local go~ernnwnt agencies that administered rhe grant programs. Further, rhc rapid
l'Xpansion of federal-state grant programs began to alter the politics of
1ntergovernmc11tal relations. It nourished larger bureaucracies at all lcvl'!s of government; interrnixed rhe operations and imerests of the fc:deral,
st ate, and local officials who administered thu11; and began to create new
111 terest groups made up of program bc·ncficiaries and their vaned political
supporters. Still embryonic 111 the late 19yis, those msritutional changes
Would accelerate in rlw coming decades and i11creasmgly reshape the de
facto operat1011s of American frderalism.
The New Deal, moreover, tipped rhe balance of rlw fc:deral system even
n,ore by expanding the institutional authority of the national executive.
Roosevelt broadened the power of the presidency by providing a charisn,atic image of national leadership, assuming a major role in initiating
and securing passage of legislation, and by boldly exercising his authority
to issue executive orders. I k also strengthened the instirutional resources
of the presidency. Although C:on,gress 1'.efused ro adopt his swt-cpi11,g plan
to reorganize the cxecmive branch, in 19 )9 it established the nxecutive
Oflice of the President, providing an expanded sraffand other 1-csources that
allowed the pres idem to exert greater control over the executive branch and
to Project his policy decisions more cffrctively.
The second major chan,ge that the New Deal brought was ro inspire substantial changes in co11stirutional law that allowed governments at all levels
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to assert expanded regulatory powers. Most obvious, the post-19) 7 Court
stretched federal legislative power far beyond its prior limits. In {foi1ecl
Stales 1'. Darby ( 194 r) it overruled Hc1111111er u. Dc1,~enhart and renounced
the idea that the Tenth Amendment created a substantive barrier against
national power. The Tenth Amendment, it declared, could never block an
action chat was otherwise within the constitutional powers of the national
government. Further, the Court broadened the commerce power to allow
far-reaching regulation of economic activities. ln the late nineteenth century it had held that the "production" of goods was not "commerce" but a
local activity immune from Congressional reach, and in the early decades of
the twentieth century it had maintained that distinction while expanding
the types of local activities that were sufficiently "close" to interstate commerce to come within Congressional power. After 1957 it found an ever
wider range of activities falling within that pow<.'.r, and in 1942 it discarded
both the close relationship test and the distinction betw<.'.en "production"
and "comm<.'.rce.'' In \Vickc1rd 11. f,jf/mm ( 1942) the Court held that Congress
could r<.'.gulate any activity that - as part oft he agg1Tgate ofal I such activitywas likdy to hav<.'. some practical <.'.€feet on interstate commerce. llmkr that
construction the commerce power seemed capable of r<.'.aching almost anything. Finally, going beyond J\las.1uchme/t1 z•. Mellon, the Court construed the
Taxing, Spending, and General Welfare Clauses with exceptional breadth.
It held that they constituted independ<.'.nt grants of power, authorized taxing and spending for the broadest purposes of national welfare, and allowed
the kderal government to make grants to the states contingent on the
states' acceptance of federal conditions and limitations. Such restrictions,
the Court ruled, neither coerced the states nor invaded any of their reserved
rights.
Similarly, as the international situation grew ominous in the late 1<J.-1os
and Roosevelt moved toward a more activist foreign policy, th<: Court
enhanced tl1<.'. powers of the president over the nation's foreign affairs. Ir
ruled that the nation's "powers of external sovereignty"'J lay in tlw execmive
branch, existed independent oft he Constitution, and operated free of restriction from any resc:rved rights of the states. In a striking decision in 1'J.-17
it held that the president had authority to make "executive agreements"
without Senat<.'. approval and that such agreements trumped otherwise valid
state laws. Thus, as foreign policy emerged as a newly dorninant concern in
the late 1950s, the expansion of presidential powu· accelerated even motT
rapidly, bringing larger areas of American ]if<: under federal authority and,
in an increasingly vital area of national concern, edging the states toward
the periphery.
''U11ifrdSic11l'.11: C11r1i,-W'ri,~li1 L,por/C(///!., ·'99 U.S. .104, .118(19,(i).
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While constitutional changes during the New Deal years substantially
expanded federal power, they also broaclen(_'d stat(' regulatory authority. Th(_'
Courr narrow(_'d its us(' of both federal pr(_'emption a11d rhe n('gat1v(' C:om!11('fce Claus(_' to allow stares an expand(_'d role in regulati11g ('Conomic act1viti('s, made stat(' rath('r then f(_'dnal common law controlling in the national
courrs on issues of stat('-creatcd rights, and in a vari('ty of cases instruct('d
the lower tl'.deral courts to dcf<-·r to th(' proc(_'(_'dings of state courts and
administrative ag(_'nci('s. Further, when it abolished the doctrines of~ substantive du(' procTss and liberty ofcontracr, the C:ourr freed stare· as well as
federal legislative power. In \\1/est Cot1sl [ [ote! Co. z·. f>drri.,h ( 1') 2,7) it overruled Aclkim 1. Chifdrm'.r [lo1jlitt1! and upheld the authority ofsrates to enact
minimum wage statutes for womt·n, subsra11tially enlarging their gcnnal
police powers. The stat('S W('re not shy about using th('ir new powns, moreover, extending th('ir regulatory, service, ancl welfare activities substamially.
ln 191 :"I state and local gov('rtiments had rais(_'d and sp('nt approximately
$ I .8 billion, but by the ('arly 1040s the comparable number was five ti mes
that amount. In addition, one of the most striking, if ind1r('ct, J"(_'sults of
the New D('a] was th(' adoption in I') 'd of tl1(_' Twenty-First Amendment,
which rqxaled the Prohibition amendm('Ilt, thereby eliminating a major
grant of fedu·al authority and restoring pow('r to the states.
The third major change that the New D(_'al brought was the transformation of th(' rederal judiuary. Roos('vclt restaffed th(' lower courts with
appointees sympath('tic to his policies, and b('tW('l'n 1<J.'>7 and 1').J"\ he
reoril·11ted tlw Suprcm(_' Court by filling scv('n of its scats with administration loyalists. The n(_'w judg('s, in turn, began to r('shapc f(_'deral law 111
line with the goals and values of the New Deal. Some rnaintainnl that they
Were merely casting off crabbed doctrinal accrnions from the larc n111t·teenth C('lltury and !"('Storing the expansive constirntional principles that
the Found('rs had originally intended. Others hega11 to articulate a new
attitude toward constitutional law. Th(_'y advanced the idea thar rhe ( :onst itution was a flexible, practical, and even "living" i11strun1ent. The Founders
had used broad and adaptive t('rms, they argued, so that Americans would
be able to respond etfrctively to future problems as the changing d(_'mands
of th(_'ir well-b(_'ing required.
Drawing on those ideas and th('ir New Deal sympathies, frd(_'ral judges
bt\~an to infuse new meanings into the constirntional ideals of libnry .llld
l'l]Uality. They began to give incr(_'ased protection to the kinds of"11nso11,d"
liberties that they believed all individuals should enjoy in a democratil
society while downgrading tht· economic 11 b('rties rhat accrued, as a practical
1
natter, pri rnarily to the benefit of large corporat 1011s and the ec01mm ical ly
Powerful. Further, th('y sou,~l1t to move beyond mere ft>rmal lc,~,d equality
and nourish ,l greater practical equality by showing, often though surely
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not invariably, a special solicitude to individuals and groups that were weak
or disadvantaged - African Americans, workers, consumers, labor unions,
political dissenters, victims of industrial injury, and unpopular ethnic and
religious minorities.
Hal tingly and somewhat erratically, the post-19 _::17 Court floated a variety
of constitutional theories to justify its shifting social orientation, including
the idea that the Constitution required it to provide special protection for
rights that were "vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions" or
that were so "fundamental" as to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."''' Although the Court did not consistently apply any single theory,
one of those it suggested would - decades later and in the wake of the Warren
Court - become particularly influential. When normal democratic political
processes were working and citizens had fair opportunities to influence their
governments, five justices declared in U11ited Stc1tes z;. C{tro!ene Prod11cts Co.
( r 9 )8), the Court should defer to decisions of the political branches. Conversely, when normal democratic processes were blocked or when they led
to systemic abuses against helpless minorities, the Court should intervene
to runedy the situation. Translating theory into doctrine, Carolene Prod11cts
suggested that judicial review should operate on two tracks. When the
Court reviewed ordinary economic regulations that resulted from normal
political competition and compromise, it would apply a "rational basis"
test, upholding government action if the action bore a reasonable relation
to some legitimate government end. When, however, it reviewed cases
involving the denial of fundamental non-economic rights or discriminatio11 against "discrete and insular mi11oricies" -situations in which ordinary
democratic processes had failed to work properly - the Court would apply
a "stricter scrutiny," an inquiry that would validate government actions
only on a showing chat the actions were narrowly tailored and essential to
achieve a compelling governmental goal.''
Regardless of its varied justifications and sometimes contradictory rulings, the post-19."7 Court was proposing itself as the protector of abused
individuals and minorities, and, in so doing, it was also turning away
from its earlier role as umpire of the federal system. On the ground chat fair
democratic politics should ordinarily prevail and that the legislative branch
represented the states as well as the people, it accepted the principle that
Congress was ordinarily the proper institution to determine whether and to
what extent federal power should be exercised. Similarly, on the ground that
the president had vast authority and discretion in the conduct of foreign
' '.\'il!//cidcr,: /n i11,~/1!//,
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relations, it increasingly deferred to executive decisions that implicated foreign policy concerns. The altered role the Court sketched would help define
the triple tracks of governmental centralization that marked the years after
r 93 7. In economic matters Congress would exercise sweeping national kgislarive authority; in foreign pol icy matters the president would exercise
an ever-growing and often uncl1ecked executive discretion; and in certain
areas involving non-economic social and political rights the Court would
come to assert an expanding national judicial authority.

\\½11: Cole/ \¥ic1r. ,me/ C11,;/ !?1ph1.1: '/he I hgh YMn o/1he Neu· Dct1! Order
World War II and the dominating events that followed - the· birth of the
nuclear age, the 011set of the Cold War, and the crncrge11ce of the United
States as the undisputed leader of"the f1-ce world" - reinforced rhe nationalizing trend that the Depression, the New Deal, and the nation's longaccelerating econom 1c and cultural centralization had forged. The war led
to massive expansions in the federal bureaucracy, swecpi ng national controls
over the domestic economy, and the induction of more than 1 (i mill ion rne11
and women into the armed forces. The Cold War that followed sustained
the national mobilization, generated a pervasive anri-C:ornmunisrn that further homogenized and centralized politirnl debate, and provided a national
security justification for growing federal inrrus1ons imo areas pITv1ously left
to the states. Turning the nation from its traditio11al and relatively aloof
foreign policy, the war and Cold War transformed the United Scates inro
a global military and economic superpower at least porenrially interested
111 even the smallest and most distant regions of the world. The 1ower and
1
activities of the federal government grew apace, and the role of the presidency, in parncular, continued to swell. The National Security An of 1947
established both the National Sernrity Council a11d the C:enrral lnrelligence
Agency as powerful a11d wel !-funded agencies of the executive hra11ch, and
the:- White House staff, which numbered 61 people at the e11d of World
War II, jumped to ',')') by I ')'57 and then to 48<; only six year later. All
extended the presidenr's ability to comrol and enforce 11ario11al policy a11d ro
shape the contours of the 11atio11's donwst,c political debates. The escalating
foreign policy challenges, moreover, induced the C:ourr to adopt a highly
deferential attitude toward both Congress and the presidc11t, temporarily
checking its proclaimed 11ew comrnitmellt to protect civil liberties. During
the war the C:ourr refused to challenp;e the army's decision ro place more
than a hu11dred thousa11d Jap,.:1ese-Americans in co11ce11rrat1011 camps, and
into the 1950s it failed to protect the civil liberties of many of those who
ran afoul of the second Red Scare that erupted in the early years of the
Cold War.
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Ahhough postwar politics grew more conservative, the major achievements of the New Deal remained largely in place. Harsh memories of the
Great Depression, the unprecedented efforts of the Roosevelt administration
to alleviate the nation's ills, and the stunning and sustained economic boom
that followed wartime mobilization combined to inspire a broad new consensus. Americans had come to believe that many of the pressing difficulties
they faced were "social" in nature, not "individual,'' and that government
could and should take a more active role in resolving them. Indeed, their
acceptance of the idea that a newly muscular federal government was necessary to protect national security in the Cold War strengthened their belief
that the same national government cou Id also act as an effective instrument of rational, democratic problem solving at home. Increasingly, they
looked to government at all levels for an expanding variety of services. Most
immediately, they had rnnw to Lx:lieve that anything affecting the American economy was properly a national issue for which the federal government
should rake responsibility. Sustaining economic growth and ensuring full
employment became domestic goals of the highest priority, and Americans
assumed that one of the primary duties of the federal government was to
underwrite the nation's continuing economic welfare. Accordingly, government at all levels grew, and the federal government expanded most rapidly.
With its unparalleled capacity for raising funds through tl1e national income
tax, and the distinct advantages its members realized from dispensing public money, Congress proved increasingly ready to finance new programs and
expand old ones. Funds allocated to regular domestic grant programs, for
example, doubled in only the first two years after the war.
Although the Republicans controlled <if one or both Houses of Congress
as well as the presidency for much of the period from r 94 6 to r 960, they
gradually acceded to most New Deal reforms and even joined in expanding
the activities of the federal government. Congress passed new public housing, urban redevelopment, and minimum wage legislation, and it expanded
federal spending programs to enlarge Social Security, guarantee opportunities for returning veterans, and provide funding for education, conservation,
hospital construction, scientific research, and rural electrification. During
the presidency of Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower from 19'd to 1961,
federal aid to states on a per capita basis more than doubled. The system of "dual federalism" had passed away, replaced by one of "cooperative
federalism" in which governments at all levels participated in a widening
variety of joim programs and dealt with national problems by blending
federal funding and direction with state· and local administration. lllustrating both the spread of cooperative fi:deralism and the ways in which
Cold War national defense concerns fostered the expansion of the national
government, Republicans and Democrats joined forces in r 956 to pass the
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Interstate I I ighway Act. The measure provided massive federal funding for
the construction ofa 40,000-rnile interstate highway system that promised
to benC:fit a wide range of groups and interests across the nation. The states
supported it enthusiastically, and Congress easily justified it as necessary
for national defense.
lndeed, the extent to which the federal system, and normative theories about it, had evolved became apparenr rather quickly. Between H)47
and 1959 Republicans and other supporters of states'-rights ideas initiated four major efforts ro study the fc:dcral system and find ways to check
and t'l've,rse the trend toward centralization. None had a noticeable impact.
During his presidency, Eisenhower sponsored two such efforts. In r 95 7, for
e·xamplc, he urged the creation ofa special govcrnmcm task force designed
"to designate functions which the, States arc ready and willing to assume
and finance that arc now performed or financed wholly or i11 part by the
Federal Covt'rnme'nt." 12 'fo accomplish that end, he cooperated with the
National Governors Conference 111 establishing a.Joint Federal-State· Action
Committee composed of officials from the highest ranks of state and kderal
government. After an elaborate and well-financed study, the com mi ttt'e was
ablt' to identify only two programs - vocational t'ducation and municipal
Waste treatmt'nt - that should be transfc:rrnl from fi:dt"ral to state conrrol.
lrlgethcr, the two programs accounted for a barely notict"able 2 percent
of total frderal grants to stat<:' and local governments. While a variety of
political and economic factors conspired to trivialize the committet''s conclusions, its much-heralded effort revealed 011e overpowering fan. By the
1 ':ls;os a complex system of nationally directed and ti.1nded cooperative frdl:ralism had been firmly established and was becomin,t; widely accepted in
both theory and practice.
While some conservatives still hoped to restore a rr101T decentralized
system, liberals worked to shape the operations of the new order to their
purposes. If national power had been drastically expanded and federalism
transformed into a '·cooperative" system, they reasoned, then the Supreme
Courr requirt'd a new institutional role adapted ro those new conditions.
Tht' horrifying brutalities of Nazi and Soviet rotal1tarian1sm inspired an
intensified commitment to the idea of the rule of law, and the tumultuous
Cold War campaigns against Communism heightened tllt'ir belief that the
nation needed a strong judiciary ro protect individual liht"rtics. Further,
the growing conservatism of the states in economic matters, their enthusiasm for fighting Communism by restricting civil liberties, and - most
1,
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crucially ~ the adamant determination of those in the South to preserve
racial segregation combined to cast a new and unflattering light on the idea
that the states were democratic laboratorie~; that should be free to conduct
social experiments. Indeed, in the postwar years the very term "social experiment" raised images not of beneficent progressive reforms but of Nazi death
chambers and Stalinist labor camps. Increasingly, Democrats and liberals
turned to the reoriented post-New Deal foderal judiciary as the government
institution most likely to enfi:irce national rules that would serve their new
values, interests, and aspirations.
One of the most thoughtful, and eventually influential, fi_lrmulations
of those liberal attitudes came from Herbert Wechsler, a prominent legal
scholar and old New Dealer. The normative constitutional problem that
postwar liberals faced, Wechsler explained, was to find a principled way
to "defend a judicial veto" when used to protect "personal freedom," but
to "condemn it" when used to block government actions '·necessary for
the decent humanization of American capitalism."'' In !<)54 Wechsler
suggested an elegant solution. The Constitution itself guaranteed statt:
sovereignty by providing the states "a role of great importance in the composition and selection of the central government." Those "political safeguards of federalism" included equal state representation in the Senate,
control over many aspects of voting and districting for the House, and a
key role in electing the president through the system of electoral votes.
Thus, the very structure of the Constitution meant that Congress and the
president would "be responsive to local values that have large support within
the states." Consequently, there was 110 need for tht: Court to protect the
states or to serve as the umpire of federalism. Instead, the constitutional
structure suggested that the Court should focus its efforts elsewhere. First,
because the federal government had no part in composing the state governments, it was the federal government, not the states, that needed the Court's
protection. Thus, the Court should ensure "the maintenance of national
supremacy against nullification or usurpation by the individual states."
Second, because the Constitution's majoritarian "political processes" would
not remedy popular and democratic abuses against disfavored minorities,
the Court should enforce "those constitutional restraints on Congress or
the states that are designed to safeguard individuals."' 1 Thus, post-New
Deal liberalism began to develop the id<::a that Caro/me Prod11cts had voiced:

'' Nor111a11 Sil her and Ccolfrcy Milkr, "'\i,ward 'Nl"utral P1·i11ripks' i11 thl' Law: Sclr·ctiom
from t hc- ( lra\ 11 isrory of I lnl)L"rt \l(/ech,lcr," Col///11Ui<1 l,d/1' l?c-1 ·irn· <); ( 199, ), 8c,.1, 92.1.
1
' 1 icrbcrt Wech,lcr, 'The Poli rim\ Salc·guards of Fnll"ralisrn: The Role of the Sratl's in
the Composition and Sclc-crion of thc- National (;ovc·rnrnent," Col///11hi<1 /,,111· i<,·1·ic11· 'j.\
(1,Jc;.1), 'i,U, 'i'il, 'i'i9, c;(,o, 11. 'i9
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the Constitution underwrote the principle that the Court should protect
abused individuals and helpless minorities, not the already powerful states
or the well-entrenched federal system.
In the postwar years the most systematically disadvantaged minority in
the United Scates was African Americans, and a variety of factors pushed
the Court to take action on their behalf Some were internal: a frw useful
precedents, the spread of post-New Deal liberal values, the justification
provided by the Cr1mlene Prod!lllJ idea, and key changes in the Court's personnel - especially the appo1 ntrnent in 1 95 ', of Earl Warren as Ch1ef.J ustice.
Others were external. The African American community had bee11 leaving
the South, developing a strong middle class, increasing in organization
and militancy, and .~aining political influence in the North. Further, the
atrocities of Nazi c;ermany had discred 1ted racist ideas, and the C:old \'var
rnade repudiation of racism necessary to counter Soviet efforts ro umlerm 111e
American influence in the Third World. The Democratic Party, roo, had
been transformed since the New Deal. Incrcaslllgly urban, northern, 1iberaL
and reliant on African American votes, it was ready to support meaningful
efforts to end racial oppression. Finally, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People was pressing a methodical legal campa(~n
against racial segregation, and its dforts presented a series ofwcll-desigm·d
constitutional challenges that allowed the Court to chip away at legalized
racial segre.~ation. To.~ethcr, the changc"S highlighted the discordant nature
of Southern raual practices, led increasing numbers of Americans to rejecr
them, and helped install 111 tlw fl'deral courts Judges syrnpatlwtic ro the
cause of racial equality.
The judicial turning point came in 1954 when rhe Court ruled in /lro11·11
1'· l3ollrd 11/ l!d11cc1tio11 (1954) that racial segregation in the public schools
violated the Equal Protection Clause and then, over the next li:w years,
cxtended its ruling to a variety of other public institutions and facilities.
Exemplifying and dramatizing the idea of the rc:deral judiuary as the protector of both fundamental non-economic rights and "discrete and insular
minorities," the decisions asserted national authority over rhe stares in a
crucial area of social policy, one that had been labeled "local" si nee the end
of Reconstruction. When Southern state governments and private citi/u1s·
groups pledged massive resistance ro Bro11·11, the Court responded in 1958
With an extraordinary assertion of national judicial supremacy signed by all
nine justices. "[T}he frdcral judiciary is supreme in the exposition of rlw
law of the Constitution," they proclaimed 111 C1111/Jc/' r. 1L11·011, and "the imerpretation of rhe Fourteenth Amendment enunciatnl by this Courr Ill thL·
l3rrJ11'11 case 1s the supreme law of the land."''' The decisions strengthennl
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a galvanizing civil rights movement, but they also provoked bitter and
sometimes violent opposition. By themselves they were unable to end
racial segregation in the South. That bad to await events of tbe following
decade.
/3ro11?1 and the civil rights struggle helped fire the tumultuous era known
as ''the sixties," a politico-cultural phenomenon that began sometime after
r 95 7, became self-conscious in thl'. rnrly r 960s, peaked between r 965 and
1972, and expired rapidly after 1974. Underlying social developments - a
sustained economic boom, rapid expansion and luxurious federal support
of higher education, the emergence of experimental "youth cultures" and
radical "liberation" movements, and the popularization of social theories
that challengcd traditional idcas across tl1l'. board - combined to spur major
changes in American attitudes and values. Melding with escalating and
disruptive protests against an ev<:r widening and seemingly futile war in
Vietnam, the changes generatcd a volatile era of turmoil and transformation,
of vaulting hopes and intensifying hatcs.
With respect to the: frderal system, the: sixti<:s initially accelerated
the trend toward centralization. Democratic President .John F. Kennedy
inspired a new cnthusiasm for liberal activism after his election in I 960,
and his successor Lyndon H. Johnson strove to build a "Great Society," one in
which the frderal government would achieve the social and economic goals
of the New Deal and ensure that all Americans shared in their benefits. The
Supreme Court became increasingly active in imposing liberal national
standards on the states, and aftcr an overwhelming Democratic victory in
1sl>4, Congress responded with a series of major domestic reforms. Furthcr,
between 1 9(i 1 to 1971 the: nation ratified four constitutional amendments,
three of which protected the right of Americans to vote, limiting state
authority and giving Congrl'.ss power to enforce their mandates.
Of most cnduring importance, the federal government as a whole finally
committed itself to the cause of black civil rights. Kennedy and Johnson
increasingly embraced the issue, and between 1964 and 1968 Congrc:ss
passed three monumental civil rights acts. Two broadly prohibited racial
and other types of discrimination in housing, education, employment, and
"public accommodations." The third negatl'.d a wide range oflegal and practicil obstacles that Southern states deploycd to dcny African Americans the
franchise. Equally important, the statutes created effective remedies for violations and made the federal govcrnment an activl'. and continuous agent of
enforccmem. Illustrating the relatively consistent purpose that animated
thc entire fi.:deral govcrnment in the late 1960s, the executive branch immediately initiated or expanded a variety of programs to enforce thc new civil
rights statutes, wh ilc the Supreme Court quickly upheld their constitutionality. Ir approved the sharply challenged public accommodations provision
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by applying the sweeping interpretation of the Commerce Clause advanced
in Wickard v. Piib11m, and it validated federal control over voting rights on
the ground that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Anwmlment gave Congress the
broadest possible power necessary to enforce the amendment's rights. By
the end of the r96os legalized segregation was crumbling, a11d the constitutional pillar of post-Reconstruction frderalism that had survived tlw New
Deal~ the principle that racial matters were local~ had been obliterated.
Congress expanded frderal authority in orlll'r areas as wdl. .Johnson's
Great Society reached into the backwaters of American life, ide11tifyi11g the
very existence of poverty and inequality as problems of national importance.
Like the theory of Cc1mle11e Pmd11cls and the concerted attack on racial discrimination, his War on Poverty sought to assist the nation's poorest groups
and remedy fundamental strucrnral inequalities. Congress aurhorized ever
more generous grants to state and local governments for a seemingly lin1itlc:ss variety of "categorical" purposes, including welfare, housing, child
care, mass transit, job training, education, urban renewal, medical insurance, and legal services for the poor. Similarly, the federal governmellt began
a concerted effort to deal with issues of environmental pollution and the
conservation of natural resources. Increasingly, moreover, the new programs
Were intended not merely to help state and local governments deal with their
])roblems but to implement national policies designed to achieve national
objectives.
A report of the federal Advisory Commission on lntcrgovernrnenral Relations published in 1967 charred the steady and accderat1ng expansion of
federal funding programs. Before 19Yl the national governnwm offrrnl
funding to state and local governments in only ten areas of activity. The
New Deal brought federal funding ro seventeen more areas, and the early
Postwar years added another twenty-nine to the list. The period from 1961
to r9(i6, however, witnessed the most explosive growth. New programs
extended federal fi.111ding to another thirty-nine areas ofswte and local ,~overnment activity -- an increase of almost 70 percent in only six years. Thus,
by r9Ci7 the fi::deral government was funding state and local government
activities in 95 areas and doing so through 2,79 separate categorical grant
j)rograms. In a decade, total ft.:deral aid ro state and local governments
tripled, rismg from $4.9 billion in 1958 to ~15.2 billion in 1967.
The political momentum carried into the next decade. Even under
Republican President Richard M. Nixon, who talked abour a "new i"ederalisn1" that would return power to the states, national activism continued.
Indeed, in the first two years of his administration federal funding to stare
,ind local govc rnments jumped by more than a rhml, reaching $25 billion
111 1970. Through a variery of changes within tlw executive branch, Nixon
enhanced presidemial power to manage both the fr.dcral bureaucracy and
0
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the distribution of funds to the states. He sought not so much to limit
federal power and government activism as to make all government agencies
more streamlined and efficient. Moreover, stressing the problem of "crime
in the streets" and the need frir "law and order," he accelerated the use of the
national government to fight crime, particularly "organized" crime and narcotics trafficking. New legislation expanded the scope of the federal criminal
law, turned a multiplying number of state-law crimes into federal violations,
and in the Racketeer Inf-luencecl and Corrupt Organizations Act ( r 970) gave
the national government muscular new tools to investi ,;ate and prosecute transgressors. Similarly, the decade brought major federal initiatives
aimed at protecting the environment and expanding government welfare services. Although some social programs, particularly those involving
Johnson's War on Poverty, were crimped or terminated, many others took
their place. During the decade total federal spending on welfare programs
more than doubled. By r979 Congress had established more than five hundred grant programs that accounted for a third of the federal budget and
furnished state and local governments with approximately 1,0 percent of
their total revenue. Nforeover, although lZepublicans criticized many aspects
of the civil rights movement, especially school busing, affirmative action,
and some aspects of anti-discrimination law, the party~ or at least its Northern wing~ accepted many of the changes the movement had brought.
As federal fu11di11g gushed forth, the national government's control over
its programs continued to tighten. Although Nixon sought to minimize federal restrictions through uncond i tio11al "revenue sharing" and less restrictive
"block grants," his efforts were only minimally successful. Federal agencies
swelled in number and responsibilities, while the scope and rnmpkxity of
their regulations multiplied geometrically. Expanding and reorganizing the
federal bureaucracy, for example, Congress established the Departments of
Housing and Urban Development ( 1965), Transportation ( r 966), Energy
( 1977 ), and Education ( 1979), as well as the Environmental Protection
Agency ( 1970), to help administer some of its new programs. The agencies spawned a growing body of regulations that ranged from detailed
rules controlling individual categorical programs to broad across-the-board
rules covering many or all grant programs. Increasingly, moreover, federal
regulations sought to serve a variety of national policies ~ ending discrimination, protecting tlw environment, expanding opportunities fcir the
disadvantaged ~ unrelated to specific grant programs themselves. During
the 1 970s the total number of federal regulations more than doubled, and
Congress and the federal bureaucracy were increasingly regulating not just
the distribution of funds but the policies and operations of state and local
governments themselves.
0
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The continul'd ~rowtl1 of kderal activism was driven in large part by
three fundamental changes in the political system. One was the increasing
centralization that marked al I areas of American public lifi:_• and transformed
ever larger numbers of issues imo matters of national concern. The accelerating nationalization and internationalization or economic enterprise, the
dramatic and unifying power of ever mon: pervasive mass media, the growing case and speed of travel, and the frequency with which Americans moved
their homes from state to sratl' and region to region combined to homogenize
Amnican Iife and cul rure, a11d the atti rnd i nal changes that resul red increasingly made most problems seem national 1n scope and resolvable only with
national solutions. Moreover, the ever-tightening tyra11ny of money in the
political process magnified the influence: of those private organizations almost always national in operation and concern - that werl' capable of
providing the huge campaign donations that the political parties required.
Those organizations -corporations, labor unions, industrial and profrssional
associations, and swelling varieties of ideological advocacy groups - almost
invariably sought, in return for their support, national policy decisions that
Would provide thc,m with advantages national in scope.
Tl1c second change lay in the new a11d stronger sets of interlocking local,
state, and national interests that resulted from the, massive federal spl'ndi11g
programs of the prior decadl's. The programs were attractive to members of
Congress who found them ideal ways to shape policy while assisting their
favored interest groups, furnwling money to their districts, and improving rlteir chances of reelection. Further, the programs developed their own
Powerful constituencies: grant recipiems and the interest groups who supported them; professionals who designed and adminisrnul the programs;
and i1rnumcrablc ofliuals at all levels of government who for reasons of
public policy, bureaucratic i11flucncc, and personal advancement found the
programs highly desirable. As fr·deral spending grew, so did the power of
those imcrlocking interests, and they continued to drive expanded frdcral
~pending in the 1970s even as the animating values of post-New Deal
liberalism were withering.
The third change was rooted in the altered role of the presidency in
an age of mass communications and cultural ce11tralization. Dominating
national politics and the public agenda, presidents - and all serious candidates for the office - found it essential to propose national solutions for
almost every problu11 that drew national attention. By the late rwcmicrh
cenrury American presidents were expected to act 110t only as chief executives and commandcrs-in-chiefbut also as legislative leaders and all-purpose
national problem solvers. The nation's seemingly limitless demands 011 the
office magnified its irresistibly ccmripetal f,:irce.
0
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While Congress, the executive, and concentrating social pressures were
extending foderal power, the Supreme Court was doing the same. Beginning in the early 1 960s, the Warren Court launched a new and broader
phase ofliberal activism. Shifted leftward by the retirement of two conservatives - including .Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court's leading advocate
of "judicial restraint" and deference to tlw states - and galvanized by the
reformist nationalism of Warren and Justice William_). Brennan, a new
majority coalesced in almost perfect harmony with the decade's vibrant
liberal politics. Between r 962 and 1 969 the Court expanded its efforts
far beyond civil rights and announced a breathtaking series of decisions
that imposed federal limitations on the states in a variety of areas. Perhaps
of greatest institutional importance, the Court asserted national authority
over the districting and apportionment of state and local legislative bodies. Rejecting earlier decisions, it ruled that the Equal Protection Clause
required that electoral districts have closely comparable populations based
on the egalitarian standard of "one person, one vote."' 6
Similarly, the Court substantially expanded the reach of the First Amendment. Construing the amendment's religion clauses, it prohibited a variety
of government-sponsored religious practices, ruling that states could not
require officeholders to declare their belief in God, sponsor Bible reading
as part of the public school curriculum, or compel schoolchildren to recite
compulsory prayers. Construing the Free Speech Clause, it ruled that tlw
states could punish advocacy only if a person's words were specifically calculated to incite imminent unlawful actions, and it held that the right of
free speech created a qualified privilege against state defamation suits, a
decision that not only limited state law but opened the way for particularly
vigorous criticism of state and local officials. Perhaps most innovative, in
Grisll'ofd 1: C()/meclimt ( 1965) it held that the First Amendment, in rnniunction with other amendments, created a constitutional right of privacy that
barred states from prohibiting residents from using or conveying inform,1tion about contraceptives.
Equally controversial, the Warren Court applied most of the rest of the
Bill of Rights to the states. Again reversing prior doctrine, it held that the
cemral provisions of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments were
"incorporated" in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteemh Amendment.
Moreover, it repeatedly broadened the protections that the clauses offered.
In what was probably its most controversial decision in the area, 1\lir,mclt1
11. 1\ri:umc1 (19(16), it required law enforcement agents to inform artTstL·es
about their constitutional rights and to respect their decision to exercise
those rights. 'fo enforce its rulings, the Court expanded the availability of
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federal habeas corpus for state prisoners, enabling the lower federal judiuary
to review state court criminal convictions more frequently. The decisions
created, in effect, an expanding federal code of criminal procedure that
bound the states, restrained police behavior across the nation, and provoked
bitter and widespread criticism.
As Congressional activism continued into the 1970s, so did the Court's.
Although Ch iefJ ustice Warren resigned in 1969 a11d Nixon appo1 nred four
new justices, including the new chic.f justice, \Xlarren E. But),cr, the Court
changed less than many expected. Indeed, i11 several areas it cominued to
extend frxleral power, making the early Buri~l'I' Court seem almost a third,
if sonwwhar ambivalent, phase of the \Xlarren Court. During the 1970s
the Burger Court gave constirunonal sanction ro some types of affirmative action, confirmed the broad power of Congress under the FourtL'Ctlth
Anwndment, and upheld a substamial, if limited, 1-cmed1al aurllOrity in
the federal courts to ordcr local officials to inregrate previously segregated
public school districts. In addition, it provided due prncL·ss protections
for w<:-Jfare recipients faced with termination ofbendirs and conrinuL·d the
Warren Court's efforts to expand the relic{ that injured individuals rnuld
obtain under a variuy of federal regulatory statutes.
In three areas the Burger Court's decisions seemed particularly liberal,
activist, and nationalist. Firsr, it held rh,lt the Equal Protection Clause
applit·d to gender classifications. Congress had hegu11 to address gender
1nec1ualiry in the 1960s, and in 197 1 the Court ruled in /?m/ I'. /?.m/ thar
a state stature disfavoring wornen violated the Constitution. Second, reaffirming and broade11ing ;he constitutional right or privacy that rhe Warren
Court had p1om·cred in (,'n.111'olcl, it held rhar the right barred stares i'ro111
Prohibiting the sale of comraceptives ro unmarried persons ,u1d, for more
innovative and comrovcrsial, atmounced in Noe!'. \Vi1clc ( 197 )) that it ,L'.uarantecd women the right to an abortion. The Burger Courr thus co11firmcd
that a 11ew and vibrant "public/private" distinction had L'lltLTed American constirntional law. Unlike the pre-New Deal Court, which had used
the distinction to protect property and economic lihnty from ,govcrnlllL'llt
regulation, however, the Warren and Burger Courts infused new rneani11g
into the dichotomy, usin,g it to protect intimate matters involvi11g sex and
\)rocreation from such imerfi.:rence. Finally, the BurgLT Court cxtendl'll the
reach of the Eighth Amendment, mandating rnrnimum fnkral standards
on horh capital pu11ishment a11d prison com I1tio11s. Its ru Ii ngs pt-cvemnl
tht• statL·s from executin,g hundreds of condem11nl prisonns, forced rhem
to make substantial revisions in their criminal laws, and compclll'll rhc111
to institute a variL·ty of reforms in the administration of' rill'1r correct ions
s_Ystcrns. By the 1980s more than 200 stare prisons and ,-\ 'JO local jai Is in
forty-three states were operating undn federal court orders.
•
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The growing control that the federal courts exercised over the nation's
prisons was only one of the more visible areas in which federal judicial supervision cabined the power of state and local officials. After I3roun the frclernl
courts had gradually taken over hundreds of schools in their efforts to ensure
that the Court's mandate was enforced. Inspired by their role in combating
racial segregation and energized by a burgeoning faith in the judiciary's
power to redress social wrongs, the frderal courts grew increasingly willing
to rake 011 broader and more complex social problems. Moreover, the explosion of Congressional legislation compelled them in the same direction.
Numerous statures created new and sometimes vague rights under many
of the cooperative programs that the federal government funded, and those
provisions spurred a rapidly expanding range of suits in the national courts
against state and local governments. Increasingly, federal judges became
active managers of ongoing litigations that sought to reform the srructutTs and procedures of those governments, and they often issued derniled
orders establishing federal rules over many areas that Congressional funding
had brought within the indirect, but nevertheless effective, control of the
national government.
Although national law and national standards had become pervasive by
the 1970s, the states nevertheless remained vital centers of power. For the
most part, their laws still controlled many of the most basic areas of American life: marriage, family, education, criminal justice, commercial transactions, zoning and land usage, estate planning and inheritance, the use of
automobiles and the highways, and most of the broad common law fields
of rort, contract, and property. Indeed, in lawsuits where state law properly controlled, fr·deral constitutional law continued to bind the nariornd
courts to follow and apply it. State and local governments, moreover, were
heavily involved in providing most services in such basic areas as eduu1tion, transportation, social welfare, police and public protection, housing
and developmental planning, natural resource conservation and usage, and
labor relations and employmellt practices. While from 1950 to I 97 5 the
number of federal civilian employees edged up from 2.1 to 2.9 million,
the number of state and local government employees jumped from 4.2 to
12 mil lion, almost 60 percent of whom were concentrated in the fields of
education and health services.
Furrher, stimulated by the federal government's expanded activism,
local reformers pushed to modem ize state governments and enhance their
administrative capacities. Liberals sought to strengthen their ability to provide greater ranges of social services, while many conservatives hoped that
stronger state governments would help check the increasing nationalization rhar marked the post-New Deal decades. From the 1940s through
the 197m the states increased their use of professional administrators and
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drafted expert commissions to frame co11stitutional amendrnu1ts and other
structural reforms that would strengthen the insritutio11s of state government. In r 962 only twenty states held annual legislative sessions, for example, bur by the mid r 970s forty-two did so. Influenced by rhe growi11g
emphasis on executive leadership that marked the 11acio11al model, sixteen
States exte11ded gubernatorial rerrns to four years, and a doze11 eliminated
long-established restrictions to allow their ,governors ro serve a second successive term. Further, 11i11etee11 states resrrucrurnl their entire l'Xecurive
branches, expanding gubernatorial powers over a varil·ty of budgetary marte rs and giving their governors greater administrative comrol over a wide
range of state and local agencies. Moreover, stare employmem, revenues,
and cxpendirnres generally expanded relative to those of. local governmem
entities, and most states cemralized their administrations by irnposi11g
a growing number of requirements and restrictions 011 local government
institutions.
Finally, states and localities were able to protect their positio11s in the
federal system by exerting persistent and dk·nive pressures 011 the national
government. They marshaled their power by establishing a variety oforgani:wrions - i11cluding the National Covernors· Assouation, the National
Conference of State I~egislarntTs, the National League of Cities, the lJ.S.
Conference of Mayors, and the National Association of· Counties - to influence federal policy and e11sure that national programs were railornl to
local needs and interests. Further, by administermg many cooperative sraretederal programs, they were able to help shape their operations and impact.
The states, too, retained substantial imkpcndence in thl'ir actions bnause
their officials continul'd to be elected directly by thl'ir cirizrns and derived
neitlwr office nor authority from rhe national governmem. While thl' states
helped elect ft deral officials, thl' fr·dl'ral govcrnrnl'llt lwd 110 such role in
State electoral processes.
0

IV. RESIIAPINC; FEDFRALISM IN AN AC;E 01·
FRACMFNTATION AND RFALICNMENT: VFC:TORS
OF AN lJNH)Ll)IN(; ERA, 1 ')7os 2"ri,,

1'lk 1960s ended badly for post-New Deal liberalism. Escalating militancy in the civil rights and antiwar movemellts brought mass protests and
civil disobedience ro the center of American politics, while the appearance
of communes, youth cultures, fi:mmism, sexual f'reedom, gay lilwration,
black nationalism, and varieties of· political radicalism f'ucled a growing
backlash among older and more conservative Arnerirnns. Three stunning
Political assassinations - Presidenr Kennedy; his brother, Robert, a senator
and Democratic presidential candidate; and Dr. Martin Luther King, .Jr.,
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the rev<:Ted and despised leader of the civil rights movement - compounded
a growing sense of turmoil, division, and crisis.
The events fragmented post-New Deal liberalism. On the level of ideas,
the fundamental assumptions that underwrote the regulatory state - faith
in science, expertise, and administrative neutrality - seemed increasingly
dubious and misconceived. On the level of politics, the war in Vietnam
pitted Johnson's Great Society against a rising tide ofantiwar sentiment that
increasingly enlisted the support of women, students, liberals, intellectuals,
and racial minorities. Those core elements of the Democratic coalition came
to view the war as a political betrayal, and an outspoken radical minority
transformed the very word "liberal" into a term of derision. At the same
time, other key elements of the coalition veered off in the opposite direction.
Many white Americans, including urban workers and ethnic Catholics,
grew increasingly angry at civil rights advances, antiwar activism, and
what they regarded as the social and cultural outrages that exploded in
the decade's second half. To make matters worst, organized labor, a central
pillar of the Democratic coalition, began shrinking in both membership and
influence.
The result was rupture and defeat. In 1968 the anti-war movement drove
Johnson from office, and disafliicted Democrats - some by voting Republican and others by abstaining in protest - helped elect Nixon president.
Campaigning against crime, radicalism, affirmative action, and the Warren
Court itself, Nixon joined leftist radicals in blaming liberalism for the
nation's problems. Although the election was close, it marked the beginning of the end of the New Deal order.
If the 1960s had been strife-torn but optimistic, the r97os were strift:torn and pessimistic. Dominated by the party's left wing, the Democrats lost
disastrously in 1972, and the Republicans suffered an equally humiliating
blow two years later when the Watergate scandal forced Nixon into the first
presidential resignation in the nation's history. The civil rights movement
fragmented over both goals and tactics, while white resentments stoked il
burning opposition that focused on school busing and affirmative action.
The war in Viemam, moreover, came to an excruciating end when the United
States withdrew its forces in 197_') and then watched as the Communist
North conquered the South, the fanatic Khmer Rouge seized control of
neighboring Cambodia, and literally millions of Southeast Asians -- many
of whom had loyally supported the United States during the war - were
murdered, starved to death, or drowned trying to escape. Further, l?.oe 1'.
\¥/Cl{/e lx·gan to unite moral traditionalists, Evangelical Protestants, and the
Catholic Church in a passionate anti-abortion movement that widened what
seemed an unbridgeable moral divide among Americans. At the same time
the Yorn Kippur War in the Mideast triggered an Arab oil embargo and
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drastic price incrl'aSl'S that created a severe tnergy crisis. The result was a
steep rcTes,ion and a dehil1tating inflation that lingered into the 1980s.
Fundamental economic problems - severe inflation, sharply rising interest
rates, high lcvc,Js of unemploymenr, and persistent l"Conomic stagnation compounded the national downswing. Increasingly, American industry lost
out to foreign competition, and in 1971 the nation wirnessed its first trade
deficit in almost a century, a deficit that multiplied more· than tenfold
by 1981. Finally, a grisly national humiliation capped the decade. Iran, a
critical Cold War ally, frll to a violently anti-American Islamic movement
that seized the lJnited States embassy and held seventy-six Americans as
hostages. Daily television coverage carried anti-American denunciations
across the world; and, when a rescue mission failed in early 1980, the
nation watched in horror as Iranian radicals gloated over the burnt remains
0 fdead American soldiers and their crashed helicopters.
Those evellts combined to destroy the New Deal order, but they failed
to generate a successor regime that was equally stable and well ddined.
Tlic, economic depression of the 19yis had confromed the nation with a
single and overwhcl rn ing cha! lenge, one that focused atrention and inrcrests
on a 11arional effort to revive and reform the economy. In conrrast, the
j)sychological dq11-c,sion of the 1970s envelopc,d the nation in a web of
amorphous anxieties and multi-cornered conflicts. If rhc earlier depression
had pitted business and the wealthy against the u11employed and the middle
class, the later one rended to divide Americans into a spli mered mu lri rude of
groups identified not only by economic and class position but also by race,
age, region, gender, religion, erhniuty, sexual orientation, and pol1tical
1ckology. The C,milmf Prodm't.1 idea of "discrete am! insular minoriries"
seemed to have become the "big bang" of a new and fragnwnti 11g politicocultural universe.
One rl'sult was that both Iiberals and conservatives showed a chastened
'>ense of limits. Liberals enjoyed their maior successes m opposing the war
and cultivating a growing concern with the environnwnt. The former was
Premised on the limits of Amcrican powc·r and the latter rn1 rhe limits of
industrial society. Conservativc·s enjoyed their grcatesr triumphs in hrin,ging rrad1tional religious ideas and neo-classic economic thinking imo rhe
Political rnainstrea;n. The former was based 011 rhe mandate of,: transcendent Cod and the larrc,r on the iron laws of the market. All rdlcned a
dee! ining fa 1th in the power of reason, science, and governmc·11t to bend rlw
future to the nation's wishes.
\Vluk rhe psychological depression deepened, other forces were beginning to nudge Americans in m,w directions. One was a complex but profound scr of attirnd inal changes: escalating distrust of government, rescntnienr against minorities, hostility toward w<:>lfare programs, rejection of
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"liberalism" and its regulatory tradition, and a fostering anger directed
against challenges to traditional religious and moral ideas - particularly
feminism, abortion rights, and gay liberation. A second factor was a longbrewing revitalization of market economics. lc>gether with the general
assault on government and scientific expertise, the spreading marker ideology helped turn the nation roward deregulation, privatization, and ,1
renewed faith in the power of private enterprise and the virtue of becoming
rich. A third factor was the formation of what appeared to be a new Republican majority based on the merger of the party's traditional supporters especially business, the well-to-do, rural Amtrica, and the old Anglo-Saxon
middle class - with new social ,1sroups, such as Catholics, ethnic whites, disaffected members of the working class, the culturally conservative "solid
South," and the growing fi:irces of Evangelical Protestantism.
Drawing the new Republican coalition together was a cultural synthesis
that implicitly reversed the values of Cc1ro!e!le Prodmt.1 and post-New Deal
liberalism. Disillusioned intellectuals began to articulate a new conservative ideology that called for a return to "authority" and to a social order
build solely on "merit." Market theorists developed the idea that politicians
responded only to organized interest groups that sought to use government
to gain special favors contrary to the common good - '"rent seeking," as they
called it. Traditional conservatives and Evangelical groups maintained that
secular liberal ism and the welfare state were undermining the nation's moral
fiber, family values, and religious foundations. Business interests sought to
minimize their legal liabilities and avoid regulatory requirements by claiming that their producrivity was at the mercy of"frivolous" lawsuits brought
by dishonest or deluded claimants seeking undeserved windfalls. Property
owners and other groups, squt:ezed by recession and angered at government
spending on social welfare programs, organized "taxpayer revolts" designed
to secure substantial reductions in local, state, and national taxation. Finally,
those who harbored resentments against racial and ethnic minorities were
angered by the "preferential treatml'nt" that the civil rights laws gave to
those whom they considered unable to succeed on their own. Subtly and
only half-consciously, those varied attitudes blended i11to a new social persuasion, one rhar saw the weak, disadvantaged, non-conformist, and ill
treated as morally unworthy and judged their attempts to secure governmental assistance as trickery and exploitation. Simply put, the ideology of
the new Republican coalition transmuted ·'discrete and insular minorities"
into "rem-seeking interest groups," the systemically disadvantaged inro
the morally unworthy. Conversely, the idt'ology elevated business and the
economically successful into exemplars of merit and paladins of the common good. Those groups were not special interests but pillars of economic
growth, national might, and moral rectitudt'. Thus, it was appropriate for
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government to foster business with deregulation and favor the prosperous
With tax cuts.
As New Deal liberalism had done, the new conservatism generated and
Popularized its own supporting constitutional theories. Rejecting what they
considered unlimited Congressional power over the economy and improper
judicial activism by the Warren Court, co11servative thinkers sought ro
discredit the former with revived ideas of state sovc·reigmy and the latter
With rc·strictive ideas about separation of powers. Although they advanced
a variety of arguments, often supported by reasoning drawn from market
economics, they rallied around the unify111g claim that post-New Deal liberalism had distorted the Consntution and abamlom·d its "original" meaning. Rejecting the idea ofa "living" Constitution, they maimamed that the
document's mcaninu
Those not biased lw; libh was fixed and unchanL'i1w.
~•
era] nationalism, they charged, could identify the Constitution's aurl1entic
meaning by focusing on its text, the "original intent" or "undcrstanding" of
its drafters and ratifiers, and the social and moral context that surrounded
its adoption.
~

Edwin Meese 111, who served as attorney general under Republican President H.011ald Reagan in the I ')Sos, emerged as the most prom1m·nt national
propo11ent of the new conservative constitutional theory. The fc·deral judiciary was designed to protect federal ism and I im ired govn11menr, Meese
insisted, and "'the literal provisions of" the Constitution'" and "rhe original
Intentions of those who framed 1t" provided the clear and correct "iudicial
st andard" for inrcrprcting its meaning. Castigating rhe "radical l\!--'.alitarianisrn and expansive civil liberrarianism of the Warren Court," he charged
that liberal judicial decisions were ··ad hoc" and even "bizarre," often "more
policy choices than articulations of const1tutional pr111ciplc." To preserve
limited co11stitutional government and construe the C:011stirution properly,
the• Court must return to the original imentions of the Founders, "the
only reliable guide for judgment.'' Such a rerurn, Meese promised, "would
Produce dcfe11sible principles of government that would 11or he tainted hy
ickological predilection." Thus, he announcul, it "has been and will continue to lw the pol icy of th is ad 1,1 m 1stra ti on to pre,s for a J urispruclence of
Original l11te11tion." 17
Although the idea of"original imenr" was an old one a11d, like the theory
of Caro/me Prod11c/1, had some merit, 1t suddu1lv he!--'.all to comniaml ,ttte11tion and inspire devotion because it was - ,tgain like Cm!/mc P/"/)d11c1.1 - a
highly serviceable tool of constitutional politics. For the nc·w consnvar1ves,
l)
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the idea of original intent provided theoretical grounds for discrediting
much of the constitutional law of the preceding half-century, and it justified
both attacks on the Warren Court and the demand for justices who would
overturn its decisions and restore the "authentic" Constitution. Indeed, the
concept of a normative original intent was inherently an instrument of
doctrinal disruption and change. Asserting the existence of a "true" constitutional meaning established in a distant past, the idea provided theoretical
justification for casting off constitutional imerpretations that had evolved
over the subsequent centuries and for rejecting judicial decisions rendered
in more recent periods. Equally important, by making eighteemh- and
nineteenth-century attitudes the touchstone of constitutional meaning, the
idea promised to st1-c11,1.;then the legal and historical arguments that conservatives advanced against the political adversaries they opposed most
intensely - those supporting gay rights, abortion, gun control, affirmative
action, restrictions on the death penalty, more expansive tort liability, rigid
separation of church and state, institutional reform litigation, and broad
federal anti-discrimination laws.
Influenced by Nixon's four appointees, the Burger Court began to reflect
those spreading attitudes. Trumpeting a new concern with what it called
"Our Federalism," it increas111gly sought to counter liberal nationalism
by limiting the reach of federal law into the operations of state and local
,i.;overnment. It expanded the immunity of government officials from civil
rights suits, curtailed remedies for those injured by violations of federal
statutes, and narrowed the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Similarly,
it cabined many of the Warn:n Court's criminal law decisions, narrowing both the Fourth Amendrnem exclusionary rule and the Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Although it did not overrule lvlirancla 11. 1\rizo11c1,
it repeatedly found ways to shrink its reach. Most commonly, the Court
targeted the institutional power of the lower federal courts, developing
a variety of procedural restrictions to limit their opportunities for liberal
activism. It required them to abstain more frequently in favor of state
forums, limited their power to issues writs of habeas corpus to state officials
and to order remedies in school desegregation suits, and used the Eleventh
Amemlrnent to deny them jurisdiction over suits against states for money
dan1agl's.

Although it employed the rhetoric of federalism, the Burger Court
seemed increasingly committed to a substantively conservative political
,1genda, especially after the appointment of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
in 198 r. Its decisions, for example, commonly deployed the rhetoric offr·deralism rn close the frderal courts to groups that the new Republican coalition had targeted - tort plaintiffs, uvil rights claimants, and state crimin,d
clcfcindants. Indeed, when deference to the states led to unpalatable results,
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the Court ofren balked. In lvlic/11.~c!ll I'. [,rm,~ ( 198 1), for example, deference
to state decision making would have meant upholdlllg the c011stirurio11al
claim of a criminal defendant. The Court's majority would allow 110 such
result. lnstead, it hroadc·ned its own jurisdiction ro review decisions of stare
Courrs and thereby extenck,d the reach of fi::dcral authority ro overt um state
court rulings.
Most fundamental to the federal system, 111 a 'i-1 decision in Nt1t1011al
Lea.~11e o/Citier 1·. Usery (1976) the Burger Court sought ro strike directly
at the New Deal legacy by revivin" the Tc:nth Amendment. Ovcrrulrnu ,l
decision of the Waircn Court, it h~~d that the Fair Labor Standards /\ct'of
1 938 (FLSA) could not be applied to state employees and, for the first time
since r C.J:,',7, voided a Congressional statute enacred under the commerce
Power. Citing the Tenth Amendment, Nc/tio11C1! Let1w1e declared that there
Were "definite Ii rn its upon the authority of Congress to n:gu late the activities
of the States as States by means of the commerce power."' H The Court,
Natirma! Ledg11e reasserted, was responsible for protecting the states fi·om
national legislative power. For three liberal dissenters, Brennan rejected rl1e
majority's holding and invoked the post-New Deal theory of rhe "political
safeguards of federalism." The "fundamen ta! tenet of· our frdcral ism," he
insisted, is "that the extent of federal intervention into the States· affairs"
Was properly determined not by the Court bur "by the States' exercise of
Political power through their represematives in Congre,s."'''
Indicative of its transitional nature as both a third \Xlarren Court and
the ur-Rclrnquist Court, the Burger Court - actually, a single justice changed its mind nine years later. Overruling N,1/irl//<1/ /,c//,~lte in another
S-4 decision, c,·,mic1 /', Sc/// 1\11tr111io J\1ctmj/l/lii,111 'fr,1111il 1\111/,oril)' ( I 985 ),
it upheld an application of the FLSA to a municipal transit system 011
two closely related co11stitutional grounds. One was rhat the Constitution
offered "no guidance about where the fromicr between state and foderal
Power lies" and, hence, gave the justices "no license to employ freestandin,g
conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring congressional authority
Under the Commerce Clause." The other ,ground was a liberal vusion of
Original intent, a broad theory of the Franwrs' design: "the principal means
chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the fulernl system
lies in the strucrure of the Federal ,govern1ne11t itself.".' In explicit tnms
the Courr adopted the reignmg liberal theory that rhe federal system was
\lroperly protected not by the Court hut by the "political sate-guards" that
the Framers had built into the c011stitutional system.
I~
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Reviving the pre-New Deal views of William Howard 1~1ft and Charles
Warren, four Republican appointees dissented vigorously. Justice Lewis
F Powell rejected the "political safeguards" theory as both functionally
inadequate and constitutionally unfounded, and he insisted that "judicial
enforcement of the Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal
sysrem." Casting a hopeful eye to the future,Justice William H. Rehnquist,
Nixon's last appointee and the author of National Leawte, agreed. The principle of state sovereignty, he declared defiantly, '•will, I am confident, in
rime again command the support of a majority of this Court. " 21 Little more
than a year later Ronald Reagan appointed Rehnquist Chief] ustice.
Elected president in r 980, Reagan did far more than that. He helped
reorient American politics, lead the nation out of the psychological depression of the r97os, and inspire a crystallizing Republican majority in its
drive for national dominance. That coalition reelected Rea,~an in r984, put
two other Republicans - George Bush in 1988 and George W. Bush in
2000 - in the presidency, and forced Democrat Bill Clinton to move his
party substantially to the right in order to scratch together two presidential
victories in the 1990s. Equally important, the new Republican coalition
steadily increased the party's strength in Congress, which the Democrats
had dominatt'd since the Great Depression. After 1980 the Republicans frequently controlled the Senate, and in 1994 they won control of the House,
a position they retained to century's end.
Reagan established both the rhetoric and direction of the new ent.
"[G}overnment is not the solution to our problc:m," he announced. "Government i.1 the problc:m." 22 His greatest success came in reshaping the
parameters of public debate and establishing the values of the new Republican coalition - religious traditionalism, suspicion of government, faith in
business and the free market, and opposition to welfare, abortion, homosexuality, and affirmative action - at the center of American politics. His
administration pursut'd four principal policies: business deregulation, tax
cuts weighed in favor of the wealthy, ht'avy increases in military spending,
and a balanced budget. In large part it delivered 011 the first three and, likely
by design, failed on the fourth - a result that led to skyrocketing fcdernl
deficits and, consequently, to intensifying pressures to cut federal domestic
spc:nding on welfare and othc:r social programs. Further, Reagan, who had
opposed both the Civil Rights Act of r964 and the Voting Rights Act of
1965, altered the position of the federal government on civil rights issues.
l !is administration opposed affirmative action and school busing, and it
1
' ,1(19 ll.S. ')7n (Powell, J, dis,srn1in1.;): i,L at .,so (Rehnquist, J, dissenting\
H.011ald Rl'agan, 'Inaugural Addrc·ss," Jan. 20, I 98 I, in P11hli, Pd/wn n/ the Preiidmt., of
tl,e [ l11itul \'1<1te1, 1 <JS, !Washington, DC:, 19N2), I.
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slackcned subsra11tially fcxleral efforts to enforce the national civil rights
laws.
Proclairni11g a11other "New Federalism," Reaga11 sought to restructure
the system far more suhsta11tially than Nixon had attempted. Nixon's "new
federal ism" had unbraced the idea o/" active government. Accepting the
need for massive federal spe11di11g it had attempted to make governmc11t
l17ore responsive and dticic11t by decentralizing rna11agen1cnt. Its primary
l17ethod was to ahando11 highly restrictive categorical grants 111 favor of block
gra11rs and general tTvenue sharing, thereby rnai11ta111ing the flow of funds
to stare and local governments hut with far kwer federal use restrictio11s. 111
contrast, Rea,t.;,lll rejected revenue sharing and, more important, sought to
l1li11i111ize or terminate federal financing and supervisio11 in as many areas
as possible. I !is goal was to shrink governnwnt at all levels. Although his
l1lost ambitious federalism proposals failed, he succeeded in ending revenue
sharint.; and reducing fr·dcral grants to state and local governments. During
the 1 ~8os funding
wclfa,re programs fell, and f{·dcral grants to stat,e
and local government dropped by 25 percent. A!011g similar lines, Reagan
substantially reduced k·dcral supervision over state and local governments.
Hi, ad Ill inistration adopted adrn i nistrative procedures to slow the growth of
federal rule making and al tern! many existing rc,t.;ulations to al low the states
greater discretion and to relieve them of· cosrly n:pornng requirements.
It consolidated seventy-seven categorical programs into nine broad lilock
grams, for example, conden,ing and simplifying a wide range of" rules and
rc•striuions. In social terms, the weak and disadvamagcd, both the working
and non-working poor, bore the hardships and deprivat l(HlS of"his federal isrn
reforms.

"ror

In spite of" its cornmitmcnt to dccemralization, however, the Reagan
adn1inistration readily embraced federal power when necessary to advance
Its political objectives. While in most case, - welfare spending and civil
rights enforcement, fcir example - curtailing frderal activism served its
social purposes, there were exceptions. When business 111terests advocatn!
hoth uniform national standards to open more miks of highway to larger
trucks and a national product liability law restricting consumer rights, Reagan supported the proposals in spite of the Lin that they required kderal
Prcen1ption of state laws in areas of traditional state control. Similarly, his
adn1in1stration readily advocated national standards in its dforr to impose
Workfare requ1rune11ts on stare welfare programs, extend kderal criminal
law to ti,ght a variety of social evils, and defeat the affirmative anion progran1s that dozens of state and local governments had cs tab! ished.
Indeed, although Republican administrations from Nixon to the second
George Bush formally upheld the banner of federalism, all rnnrributnl to
the further centralization of American government. In domestic matters
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they joined Democrats in expanding national involvement in such traditional state areas as education and family relations, and they pushed against determined Democratic opposition - to nationalize clements of tort
law in order to restrict suits against business and governnwm. Further, they
helped frderalize ever larger realms of the criminal law. Indeed, by 1996
more than 40 percent of all federal criminal statutes had been enacted since
Nixon's election in 1968. Similarly, the Republicans steadily reinforced
the expansion of presidential power and the prioritization of military and
forei,~n policy concerns. That persistent emphasis impinged on the states
by centralizing issues of paramount public concern, expanding the de facto
scope of frderal authority, and divcrti ng resources from domestic programs
that the states helped control to the military and national security institutions that operated under exclusive fr·deral authority. Ironically, the end of
the Cold War between r 989 and 1991 seemed to lead only to rapid international desrabil ization, further magnification of foreign pol icy anxieties,
and an ever greater concentration of power and discretion in the federal
executtve.
By the end of the 1 980s the successive achievements of post-New De,tl
liberalism and the decentralization efforts that began after , 969 had combined to alter and in some ways strengthen the nation's ft.:deral system.
The former accomplished three critical results. First, compcllin,~ the stares
to redistrict their legislatures, post-New Deal liberalism increased urban
representation in many states and helped create new legislative coalitions
that began to address the pressing problems that earlier rural-dominated
legislatures had ignored. Second, it brought the franchise to African Americans in the South and forced broad non-discrimination policies on all
states. The result was to ensure fairer treatment for minority groups and to
begin mitigating abuses that had long tarnished the claim of states' rights.
Third, federal matching grants stimulated new social programs and spurred
many states to modernize and professionalize their governmental structures.
Between 1965 and r 980, for example, twenty-two states redesigned their
executive branches; the number of state employees who worked under mcri t
systems rose from 50 to 75 percent. Similarly, thirty-four ,rates reorganized
and expanded their court systems, and all fifty established offices of court
administration to address caseload hurdt·ns and increase judicial dliciency.
Those achievements substantially enhanced the ability of the states to
handle the consequences of the new decentralization that began in the
1970s. On one level, the decentralization effort made the national government rnore responsivc to state complaints about bureaucratic waste and
unnecessary administrative burdens. The result was the elimination or simplification of many fr·deral regulatory procedures and a greater flexibility
at the state and local levels in shaping government programs. On a second
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level, dcce11tralizatio11 allowed srates to rake greater co11trol over the programs they adm Ill istercd a11d encouraged them to modernize their adm i 11 istrativc structures and use their c11hanced capaci tics to initiate new programs
and approaches of their own. Bcgi1111i11g in the 1970s the states emharknl
0 11 a range of new i11itiatives to expand social services, improve fi11ancial
capabilities, attract outside investment, develop energy and conservation
programs, a11d reform their public education and criminal Justice systems.
On a third level, the decentralization movemellt revived rhe idea oi' the
States as laboratories that could attempt valuable social experin1ems. The
st ares began to look ro one another- rather than to the fc·deral government for new ideas a11d teclrniqucs, and with increasing frequency they borrowed
from the approaches rhat their sister states had tried and fou11d effrcrive.
Wisconsin exemplified both the era's new srate activism and its growi11g
social conservatism. 111 the century's early decades \X/isconsi11 had pioneered
many progressive social measures, and in the 1990s it emerged once more as
an innovative force, this time in developing restrictive ·'workfare" programs
designed to reduce taxes, curtail welfare coverage and be11dirs, and compel
recipienrs quickly to fi11d privare employment. Its approach c11couragnl
conservative attacks on the federal welfare system and not only influencnl
Other states but also had an impact at the 11atio11al level. l11 19,y{i Wiscons111
again stood as a paragon of laboratory fr·,k:ralism when the fr.demi governrnent invoked its experience i11 substanrially revamping the narion's welfare
law. A m011umenral fc:deral welfare reform act c·ncoura;,;nl rhe wider use of
Workfare requirements, clirninatnl some 11atio1ial programs, expandl"d the
Use of block grants, and al lowed the stares greater leeway i II shaping t he1 r
0 wn systems.
In spite of rhe decentralization efforts, however, governmental power at
the national level remained decisive. That facr was nowlll're more appare11t
than in the movement to replace welfare wirh workfare. Although \X/isconsin illustrated a renewed vitality in state governments, the welfare reform
law that Congress enacted in 1996 demomtrated that the f<.-deral governn1e11t remained the paramoum force in csrablish1ng national wt"lfare policy.
'fhc an not only required the adoption of workfare policies, hut ir also
con1pclk·d the stares to comply with a 11u111bcr of other rigorous fr.deral
mandates, including the imposition of rime lirrnts on el1g1hility, rnluction or wirhl10ldi11g of hendirs for certain classc·s of rnipicms, rcportin,;,;
Procedures involving the parcrnity ,llld i111111igrati011 status of undnagc
bcnl'ficiaries, and the development of various centralized procedures for
administering key clements of state welfare programs.
Contemporaneous developments in the state courrs suggested similar
conclusions about the continuing dominance of national standards. Those
courrs had authority to construe rheir own state const1 tutions, and rhcy were
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free in most cases to establish broader individual rights and liberties than
the U.S. Supreme Court recognized under the Federal Constitution. Not
surprisingly, then, in the r 970s liberals reacted to the narrowing constitutional decisions of the Burger Court by urging the state courts rouse their
indcpcndem authority to counteract irs decisions by cxpanding individw1l
rights under their separate state constitutions. Some responded, and a number of stare judges invoked their authority to establish rights broader than
those recognizt:d in federal law. The liberal appeal to state judicial powt:r,
however, brought only limited and scattc·red results. For tht: most part state
courts spurnt:d their opportunities and in the ovcrwhdming majority of
relevant cast:s chost: either to rely on frdnal constitutional law directly or
to conform state constitutional law to the contours of federal law. Indeed,
when the courts of Cal ifomia and Florida refused to follow decisions of the
Burger Court, they were abruptly reigned in. Both states responded with
constitutional amendments that required their state courts to bring tht:ir
interprt:tations of certain state constitutional provisions into conformity
with the decisions of tlit: U.S. Supremt: Court.
The relativdy conformist behavior of the state courts suggested sevt:nd
interrelated conclusions about American fr·dt:ralisrn in the late twentieth
ct:ntury. One was that undcrly111g social, cultural, and economic forces were
continuing relentlessly to centralize national affairs. ln spite of the swdling
paeans to fodcralism, Americans were ever more commonly advancing their
val ut:s and policies as properly "national" in scope. Although they frequently
and sometimes bitterly disputed rhe naturt: of the values that were proper,
they nevertheless insisted ever more stridently that their own values whatever they were - be given national recognition. The second conclusion was that the U.S. Supreme Court was playing an ever more prominent
and important role in public affairs. To a growing number of Americans it
was the truly "supreme" authority that could and should rulc on all major
issues that faced the nation. Americans were beginning to view the Court,
in other words, as they had come to view the presidency - as an institution
that should address not only problems that were properly "national" in
some antecedent and technical co11stitutional sense but also all issues that
had become, as a practical fact of everyday life, important to the nation as a
whole. A third conclusion was that the concept of"federalism" had lost most
of its substalltive meaning as an mdependent normative guide to the distribution of governmental powers. While theories of federalism continued
to proliferate and activists of all stripes persisted in invoking the concept's
authoriry, little remained of the idea that could not readily bt: turned to
partisan use by able and designing hands. The fourth and last conclusion
was that a politically conservative and socially ungenerous mood had come
to pervade political attitudes across the nation. The state courts properly
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followed the U.S. Supreme C:ourr, many Americans sc<:'mcd to believe, not
just because it was the authoritative voice of the national Constitution but
also because it was - with a fi_,w glaring exceptions - moving that law, for
the time at least, in the general directions they considered desirable.
Although the Court increasingly reflected the values of the 1ww Republican coalition, Reagan and his successors failed to transform the Supreme
Court as quickly or completely as the New Deal had done. lktwec11 19_15
and 1969 the Democrats had controlled the presidency for twenty-eight of
thirty-six years, the Senate for al I but four of those years, and both together
for twenty-four years. Conversely, in the decades after 1968 the Republicans controlled borh the presidency and the Senate simultaneously for
only six years, 1981 through 1987, a period in which only two vacancies
occurred. Thus, Republican nominations were commonly subject to Democratic check. Then, further d ii uri ng thci r drive for control, during the 1990s
Clinton was able to add two moderate liberals to the Court.
Even though Republican presidents were responsible for ten of the twelve
Justices placed on the Court after 19(i8, their new appointees failed to form
a consistently united bloc. Indeed, only three of them pushed aggressively
and relentlessly to implement the values of the new Republican coalition.
In contrast, three others edged 111to the Court's moderate-to-liberal wing,
and the remaining four were often cautious and respectful of precedent,
rather than ideological and ardent for change. As borh conservatives and
0
Pponenrs of judicial activism, the moderate four may havl' fc·lc thernsclves
bound to honor the principle of.11,;re deu11J and to rcmaill for rhc most part
Within existing constitutional challnels. Thus, a comhillarion of external
chccks, internal barriers of role alld doctrint', and differing jurisprudenrial
orit'ntations prevented abrupt change in many areas.
Although a variety of obstacles slowed Republicall efforts to remake the
federal judiciary, the party's determined drive nevertheless beg,m to bri11g
increasingly substantial results by the late 1980s. Methodically appomting
ideologically sympathetic judges, Reagan and Bush increasillgly turned the
lower frderal judiciary toward the values of the new Rcpublirnll coalitirn1.
Far more visibly, they did the same to the Supreme Court. Reagan markedly
changed its direction when he elevated Rehnquist to the cenrcr chair Ill
T986 and then added conservative Justices Antonin Scalia alld Anthony
Kennedy to the bench. Then, when Bush replaced liberal.Justice Thurgood
Marshal 1, the last survivor of the Warren Court, with the rigidly consnvative
J List ice Clarence Thomas in 1991, he established a relatively firm five-justice
conservative bloc that began to an with increasing boldness.
In the name of frderalism the new majority took particular aim at the
Powers of Congress, and in the century's last eight years it voided at least
ten Congressional statutes Oil frderal ism groullds. In LI 11i1ed St11/e.1 1·. l-11/1e::
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( 1995), the five-justice bloc voided the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which
made it a crime knowingly to possess a gun near a school. The decision
seemed to limit the Commerce Clause to formally "economic" activities
that Congress could show were directly related to interstate commerce. Five
years later in U nitecl Stet/es l'. Morri.1011 (2000) the same five justices relied on
Loj1ez to void a provision of the Violence Against Women Act that created a
federal remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence. Such violence, the
Court explained, was "not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.""'
Similarly, the Court deployed the judicially created doctrine of standing to
trump Congressional power to enforce federal environmental laws through
private lawsuits, and it even suggested doctrinal grounds for possible fi_1ture
use in enforcing limits on the spending power.
More pointedly, reacting against national regulation of state and lonil
governments, the Court severely constrained frderal power over the states
themselves. First, in 1996 it held that the Eleventh Amendment barred
Congress from using its commerce power to create claims against states,
and thn:'e years later it extended that holding to all of Congress's Article I
powers. Second, it narrowed the Fourteenth Amendment for the same purpose. Although the Court did not challenge the principle that Congress
could abrogate state sovereign immunity whe11 legislating under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, it created severe limitations on the power
and invalidated a series of' Congressional statutes that imposed liabilities on states for violating federal civil rights statutes. Finally, the Court
f'urthcr insulated the states from federal power by developin,l( an "anticommandeering" principle that forbad Congress from requiring states or
their officials to assist in implementing federal regulatory programs.
Although the Rehnquist Court revived the Tenth Amendment, it did
not use it to remove a broad category of "Joni!" activities from federal
authority as the Taft Court had clone in Drexel f11mit11re. Rather, in the
spirit of Nation,d LM,~llf, it employed the amendment more narrowly and
seemed primarily interested in protecting the operations and institutions
of the state governments themselves. Its decisions restricting the lower
foderal judiciary paralleled its decisions limiting Congressional power. The
Rehnquist Court curtailed federal habeas corpus, shrank remedial authority
over institutional reform suits, and narrowed substantive liabilities under
federal statutory and constitutional provisions in order to minimize federal
Judicial intervention in the operations of state and local governments.
Beyond insulating state governments, the Rehnquist Court's decisions
limiting Congressional power seemed targeted primarily at civil rights legislation. Its Commerce Clause decisions limited Congressional authority
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to activities that were primarily "economic;" its Section 5 decisions struck
directly at the principal Congressional power specifically designed ro prot('ct disadvantaged social groups. Politically, then, the Court's efforts to
constrain Congress seemed to reflect rhe social and cultural strains of the
new H.epublican coalition more than its free marker and business-oriented
aS]XTtS.
The Rehnquist Court's lack of sympathy with the federal civil rights
laws was apparent. Immediately after the last Reagan appoi11t<.'l' took his
sear i11 1<J88, ir issued a stunning scriL·s of decisions that method1cally
narrowed rhe uvil rights laws and restricted the remedies available for their
violation. I ts decisions struck most ruthlessly ar affirmative action programs
and employment discrimination law. Revealingly, when the Court dealt
With affirmative action, it readily set aside its goal of insulating the states
and imposed federal constitutional restrictions on their power to establish
such programs.
Th<: political sig11ilicancc of the Court's civil rights decisions was clear.
Si11ce I ')68 Repuhl ica11s had dqiloyed the language of federal ism to shape
a "Southern strategy" that sought white votes by opposing uvil rights
activism allll, in particular, affirmative action programs. The Reagan administration had followed the same course, imensifying rhe rhetoric, limiting
cnforcenwm of the civil rights laws, and - for the first rime si11ce llrou·11 bringing the fc:deral goveinment into court to oppose civil rights claims.
Then, in 1 <J88 Reagan's vice president, (;corgc Bush, was elcnnl presidu1r
after a campaig11 rhar prornis<:d "law and order" and featured a notorious
tckvision advntisement rhat was widely perceived to be racist. When rhe
Democratic Congress attempted to pass legislation to coumcr the Relrnquist Court's civil rights decisions, Bush vetoed one bill and then compelled
Congress to weaken another before signing it. The Rehm1uisr Court's civil
rights decisions fit snugly with the Republican program.
Nor surprisingly, the Rehnquist Court also followed the Reagan a11d
Bush administrations in asserting national authority to enforce other vallies of the Republican coalition. Joining the effort to restrin tort claims
against husl!less, it readily displaced state law when fr·dcral rules served the
Purpose. Similarly, it expanded fr·deral power under the Due Process and
'Etkings Clauses, l1111irnl state power rn cnforc<: environmental regulano11s,
and applied a broad First An1e11dment righr or association to allow large
private organizations ro exclude homosexuals. Indeed, in decisions protecr'11g private property, it again set state authoriry aside by im11osing a federal
constitutional duty on states to provide tax rdi.mds Ill certain cases and,
further, suggested rhar the 'fakmgs Clause might override star<: sovereign
1 1
_11" 1llunity and allow federal courts to order statl'S to pay just compensation
for certain regulatory actions.
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Equally reve::aling, howe::ver, the:: Rehnquist Court also asserted federal
authority for othe::r purpose::s as wdl. lt enfiirced First Amendme::nt limits
on gove::rnments at all le::ve::ls, and it use::d the:: negative:: Commerce Clause
and the doctrine of implied preemption to displace state law and expa11d
the reach of much fede::ral le::gislation. Indeed, during the last decade of· the
twentieth century the Rehnquist Court v01ded actions taken by states 111
54.7 percent of the relevant cases it de::cided ( 1 1 1 of 201,), an invalidation
rate that was slightly higher than the Warre::n Court's rate of51,.<i percent in
such cases during its sixte::en years of existence ( 1 28 of 2 -i9). Most artTsting,
on occasion it e::ven asse::rted national powe::r in ways that conflicted with
the values of the Republican coalition - though only over scathing disse11ts
from the justices most fervently committed to those valuc:s. A slim, moderate majority, for example, preserved the:: federal constitutional right to an
abortion and used the Pourteenth Amendment on occasion to protect both
women and homosexuals.
Thus, in spite of its rhe::toric, the Rehnquist Court did not simply defer
to the states or check national power in all areas. Nor, of course, did it
invariably honor the values of the Republican coalition. Rather, it did what
its predc:cc:ssors had done: it c:nforced its own peculiar version of fr·deral ism as
determ ine::d by shifting coalitions among its j usticc:s, c:ach of whom sought ro
meet the new and u11expected challenges that were genc:ratcd by a changing
and dynamic society. Like the liberal Courts that followed the New Deal,
it reflected the variations and inconsistencies of its nine: justicc·s as well
as the characteristic values that marked thl' shared jurisprudential ideas
of its generally dominant majority. Indeed, as its frequent willin,~ness to
assert a muscular federal judicial power evidenced, the Rehnquist C:ourt
seemed driven as much by three substantive social goals as by any principlc:d
concern for the states. It sought to limit government regulatory authority,
particularly in the areas of civil rights and environmental protection; it
sought to restrict lawsuits against both business and governme::nts; and it
sought to shrink the rights of criminal defendants and prison inmates.
Bc:yond the specific social policies it sl'rved, the Rehnquist Court stood
at century's end 011 three fundamental propositions about Arnc:rican fc:dcralisrn. One: was that the power of Congress had become all encompassing and
that limited constitutional government required the imposition of some
kind of dfoctive limits. The second was that the power of the narional govc:rnment over the statc:s thc:msclves had to be circumscribed sc:vercly. The
last was that the: "political safo,~uards" offrderalism, whatc:ve::r their efficacy
in prior times, were no longer adequate to chc:ck federal power and protect
state indc:pendc:nce. All three propositions pointed to the same conclusion:
the Court itself must enforce limits on national power.
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However sound thl:' Court's premisl:'s a11d conclusion, at century's C:'nd
the fundamental - and operational - questions remained as they had been
ever since 178sr What specific vision of kderal ism should he adoptecL'
What specific limits should he enfcJrcecL' Which governments -- and which
branches of government - should be subject to fednalism's limitatirn1s 1 For
what purposes, and in whose interests'

CONCLUSION

AMERICAN FIDERALISM AT CliNTllRY'S FND

The twemicth cenrury ended, almost literally, wirh limb 1·. (,'01·e (2oorJ).
There, the five-justice Rehnquist majority asserted a quesrirnwhlc jurisdiction to determine who would win the presidential elccrion of 2000 and
then, on sharply colltested grounds, rull:'d in favor of Republican George
W. Bush.
In the most dramatic manner possible the decision rl:'vealed two fundamental characteristics of American fr·dcralism. First, it demonstrated the·
extent to which the Supreme Court had n1oved to a position of institutional
centrality in American government. In troubled elections 111 1800 and
r824 the I louse of Representatives had follownl constitunonal provisions
in determining who would be the next prcsidcm. In the bitterly disputed
tkcrion of 1870 a speual extra-constitutional ccrn11nission composed of
hve representatives each from the Senate, I louse, and Supreme Court had
convened to i-csolve the same issue. Notwithstanding prior practice, co11stitutio11al clauses, and statutory provisions that suggested Congress or the
st ate legislature as the authoritative 111stitutio11, the Court stL·ppnl imo the
disputed elecrion of 2000 and dcudcd the outcome. Alone. No hrallch of
Congress sought to intervene or participate, and no branch of state government moved to oppose. Deeply and closely divided, the nation acceptnl the
C:ourr's decisive roll:' as practically necessary and co11stitutio11ally proper.
B11.1h 1: Gore capped the Rehnqu1.st Court's basic institmional achieverncnr: confirming the evolutio11 of the role a!ld authority of the federal
judiciary - and, ;iarticularly, the Supreme Court itself~ that h«d occurred
0
vn the previous century or longer. That evolution had elevated the C:ourc,
With the lower j ud iuary as its wide-reaching arms, co a position of· sweepi 11,g
1nstitutio11al authority. Repeatedly, the Rehnquist Court insisted that 1t
Was the final arbiter of rhe Constitution, and it hrou,gllt llL'W viral1ry ro the
Warren Court's pronouncernenr of Judicial authonty in Coojh'/' 1·. !Lmw. "It
is the responsibility of this C:ourt, nor Congress, co define the suhstame of
constitutional guarancees," 21 it declared in shrinking Congressional power
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and asserting its own primacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. Not
surprisi11gly, the Rehnquist Court exceeded the Warren Court in the rate
at which it held federal as well as state actions unconstitutional.
Second, l31/.\h I'. Gore exempli tied the shifting, contested, and instrumentalist nature of American federalism. Although some oft he legal issues were
novel, the decisive constirnrional issue was stark: did authority to settle the
matter reside at the state or national leveP Unlike the many cases in which
rhe ideology of the new Republican coal1rion coincided with deference to
the states, in 1311.1h z•. Gore the two conHicced. The Jive-justice majority
bloc rushed to trump state sovereignty with national power. "[T}he fedend
government is not bad but good," one of the majority justices had cold
a const'rvative audience some two decades earlier before ascending to the
Courr. "The trick is to use it wisely." 2 ' As the twentieth century ended,
L311Jh z: Gore stood as a monument to the dynamics of American federalism,
the system's paradigmatic case.
Thus, in spite of the many changes that reshaped the system and restructured its opt:rations, American federal ism closed the twentieth century
much as it had begun it, as a somnvhat disjointt:d a11d malleable, but neverthelt:ss stablt: and democratic, systt'm of governmenr with the capacity
to confront new problems a11cl adapr to nt:w conditions. A variety of social
and cul rural factors sustaim·d its working order: a strikinp;ly diverse population that e11joycd prosperity, education, and freedom; a variety of frirrnal
and i11formal checks that helped coumt:r concentrated powt'r; the mgrained
social values, cultural habits, and institutional practices that constituted
the natio11·s viral, if inherently human, rule of law; and a sustaining popular
faith that the nation was committed, ultimately if quite imperfectly, to rhe
lofty ideals it formally proclaimed. American federalism maintained itself
in the twentieth century not because the Constitution set forth bright lint:s
that defined state and federal power or because the Court articulated its own
consistent and unchanging rules but because the system's complex operations were shaped and constrained by that social, cultural, and institutional
base.
-'i

1\11tot1i11 Scalia, "Thl' 'hvo 1:acl's ol !'cdcralism," lf,m'drd.f111m1(!/ o//.,111'dll(( JJ11h/1( i'oli1)
() (ll)H2), [(), 22.

